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I. INTRODUCTION
The upsurge in securities fraud cases, especially those involving
insider trading, has subjected the federal securities laws to political
debate, ethical examination, and perhaps most startlingly, intense
media attention.' The term "inside information" is now common
parlance beyond the context of securities trading to describe situa-
tions in which previously undisclosed information is used to gain
an unfair transactional or tactical advantage.2
* Senior Attorney, Division of Enforcement, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. B.A. 1978, Loyola Marymount University; M.A. 1980, Fordham University;
J.D. 1985, Georgetown University Law Center. The Securities and Exchange Commission,
as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by
any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the author's colleagues, or the staff of the
Commission. Certain of the views expressed in this Article concerning the misappropriation
theory and the scope of private rights of action for insider trading differ from positions
taken by the Commission in many cases discussed herein and in statements to Congress
regarding proposals for insider trading legislation.
1. See, e.g., Wall Street (20th Century Fox 1987).
2. The term "insider trading" is a misnomer because it applies to trading by persons
who are not insiders of the corporate issuer. "Inside information" does not necessarily
relate to the internal operations or prospects of the corporation. Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part
I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41
Bus. LAW. 223, 224 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is the only provision that specifically
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Despite the attention given to insider trading, there is little
consensus as to the meaning of the term. "Insider trading" is not
defined in the two major federal acts regulating securities trans-
actions, the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 4 No specific definition of insider
trading exists in the broad antifraud provision in Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act5 or its companion rule, Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rule lOb-5. 6 Congressional efforts to enact a
definition have not been successful to date. In 1987 the SEC
regulates trading by corporate insiders, a class which includes only officers, directors, and
beneficial owners of 10% of any class of equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988). This
section permits a corporation or its shareholders to sue to recover short-swing profits made
by an insider in transactions in the company's securities when the insider purchases and
sells, or sells and purchases, the company's stock during a six month period. 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b) (1988).
To trigger liability under § 16, both a purchase and a sale, or vice-versa, must occur
within a six month period. Section 16 does not prohibit unmatched purchases or sales by
insiders during the statutory period even if the trades are based on material nonpublic
information. Therefore, § 16 does not prevent some fraudulent insider trading by even the
narrow class of persons subject to its prohibitions. See Samuelson, The Prevention of
Insider Trading: A Proposal for Revising Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 25 HAxv. J. ON LEOMS. 511, 518 (1988).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988).
4. Id. § 78a (1986).
5. Id. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contrayention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
6. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1989). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the malls or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
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proposed legislation to codify a definition of illegal insider trading
that would make unlawful the purchase or sale of a security while
in possession of "material, nonpublic information" when the use
of the information is "wrongful." ' 7 The SEC's support for a
legislative definition of insider trading reversed its long-standing
position in opposition to congressional efforts to enact such a
definition.'
7. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, reprinted in 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1817 (1987) [hereinafter SEC Legislative Proposal]. The SEC's proposed legislation
deems use of the information wrongful when:
[S]uch information has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, directly or
indirectly, (A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through electric or
other means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, or any other breach of a
fiduciary duty, breach of any personal or other relationship of trust and confi-
dence, or breach of any contractual or employment relationship.
Id. Corporate entities could avoid liability under the section if they prove that the
information was not used in trading or did not influence the investment decision, and if
appropriate "Chinese wall" procedures are in place. See id.
The SEC's legislative proposal was a compromise arising out of meetings between the
SEC and an Ad Hoc Legislative Committee formed by the private securities bar. Letter
from David S. Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Senators Donald
W. Riegie and Alfonse M. D'Amato (Nov. 18, 1987), reprinted in 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1819 (1987). The SEC's proposal included a provision granting a cause of action
to private parties who trade contemporaneously with persons whose trading violates rule
lOb-5. This provision was enacted as part of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
Senators Riegie and D'Amato requested that the Ad Hoc Legislative Committee draft a
bill defining insider trading, which was introduced on June 17, 1987, as S. 1380. 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S8297 (daily ed. June 17, 1987); see Definition of Insider
Trading, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1987) (joint written statement
of Harvey L. Pitt and John F. Olson). The Ad Hoc Legislative Committee proposal
prohibits the use of information obtained "wrongfully" and the "wrongful use" of the
information in a purchase or sale. Information is obtained "wrongfully" when it is obtained
by "theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual employ-
ment, personal or other relationship of trust and confidence." S. 1380, § 2(b)(1), 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. S8297 (daily ed. June 17, 1987). The information subject
to the prohibition includes information relating to the "market" for a security. Id. §
2(b)(2).
8. Senator D'Amato pushed strongly for legislation defining insider trading during
the Senate's consideration of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. See 130 CoNG.
REc. S8912-13 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). Senator D'Amato's
proposal would have prohibited trading while in possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation when use of the information violated "fiduciary or other contractual obligations."
See The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1984) (draft legislation of Sen. D'Amato).
Although the legislation passed by Congress in 1984 uses the term "insider trading" in
its title and the legislative history is replete with references to it, the act only refers to
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The effort to codify a definition springs in part from the
haphazard development of the law of insider trading. The provi-
sions that govern insider trading, Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, are
catchall antifraud provisions that were drafted to ensure flexibility
rather than to serve as strict guides for conduct.9 Seeking to limit
the breadth of these antifraud provisions in the insider trading
context, the Supreme Court required in Chiarella v. United States °
that the trading defendant owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation
and its shareholders as a prerequisite for liability." In Dirks v.
SEC, 2 the Court reaffirmed the Chiarella holding on the fiduciary
duty standard, stating that there is no general duty to disclose
material information before trading unless such a duty arises "from
the existence of a fiduciary relationship."' 3
The government has been able to effectively bypass the holdings
of Chiarella and Dirks by relying on the misappropriation theory
in enforcement actions against persons who are not insiders of the
issuer. This theory proscribes the wrongful conversion of material
nonpublic information in connection with a securities transaction.
Liability may be imposed regardless of whether one has a fiduciary
duty to the corporation or its shareholders.' 4 Until 1988, however,
transactions by persons "in possession of material nonpublic information," and relies on
the courts to determine what types of trading violate rule lOb-5. See 130 CoNo. REc.
H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (language of the legislation is not designed to restrict the
flexibility of the courts to determine violations). The legislative deference to the judiciary's
rules for what conduct constitutes insider trading was repeated in the creation of a private
cause of action enabling contemporaneous traders to sue for insider trading. See infra text
accompanying notes 146-160.
9. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
10. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 55-77 (discussing Chiarella).
11. The Supreme Court described the fiduciary duty necessary for the imposition of
liability for insider trading as "a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction." Id. at 230.
12. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 78-87 (discussing Dirks).
13. Id. at 654.
14. The Supreme Court refused to consider the misappropriation theory in Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 236. In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court split 44 in
upholding the Second Circuit's application of the theory to trading by a reporter who used
information about companies discussed in a news column prior to its publication in the
Wall Street Journal. See infra text accompanying notes 115-125 (discussing Carpenter).
Recent SEC insider trading cases continue to rely, in part, on the misappropriation
theory. See, e.g., SEC v. Saul, No. 90 Civ. 2633 (N.D. Ili. filed May 8, 1990) (Complaint
1 17); SEC v. Finacor Anstalt, No. 89 Civ. 7667 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 16, 1990) (First
Amended Complaint 12); SEC v. Wang and Lee, No. 88 Civ. 4461 (S.D.N.Y. filed June
27, 1988) (Complaint 12); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 6209
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 7, 1988) (Complaint 179, 521, 654, 672). The government's use
of the misappropriation theory has, however, been criticized by commentators who argue
that the theory does not comport with Chiarella's fiduciary duty principle. Phillips & Zutz,
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a decision by the Second Circuit prevented private parties from
relying on the misappropriation theory as a means of recovery for
insider trading, 5 and other courts used Chiarella to r6strict standing
for private rule lOb-5 actions. 16 Thus, although Chiarella and Dirks
involved government criminal and civil enforcement actions, these
cases limit the ability of private parties to sue for alleged violations
of rule lOb-5.
The development of new financial instruments and forms of
corporate transactions in recent years places the fiduciary duty
principle at odds with the economic reality of the securities markets
and the goals of the federal securities laws. 7 Persons who may be
injured by illegal insider trading generally fall into three categories:
(1) purchasers and sellers of equity securities; (2) purchasers and
sellers of derivative securities, such as options, and debt securities;
The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair, 13 HoFsTA L. REv. 65, 91
(1984) (misappropriation theory is a "misconceived effort to broaden the narrow focus of
the insider trading doctrine"); Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DuKE L.J. 960, 984 (misappropriation
theory conflicts with Chiarella by disassociating fraudulent act from investor's decision to
purchase or sell); Warren, Who's Suing Who? A Commentary on Investment Bankers and
the Misappropriation Theory, 46 MD. L. REv. 1222, 1248 (1987) (misappropriation theory
works a serious distortion of rule lOb-5); Note, The Misappropriation Theory: Rule lob-5
Insider Liability for Nonfiduciary Breach, 15 FoanDHiUm URB. L.J. 1049, 1071-72 (1987)
(misappropriation theory not related to purposes of the Exchange Act); Note, The Supreme
Court's Missed Opportunity: Carpenter v. United States, 11 GEo. MASON U.L. REv. 225,
234 (1988) (misappropriation theory applied in Carpenter reaches acts outside the scope of
rule lOb-5); Comment, The Misappropriation Theory: The Wrong Answer to the Chiarella
Question, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 701, 720 (1987) (misappropriation theory inconsistent
with the securities laws); Note, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the
Second Circuit Gone Too Far?, 61 ST. Jont's L. REv. 78, 103-04 (1986) (misappropriation
theory conflicts with Supreme Court precedents interpreting rule 10b-5); See Note, United
States v. Carpenter: An Inadequate Solution to the Problem of Insider Trading, 34 WAYNE
L. REv. 1461, 1473 (1988) (misappropriation theory creates confusion in application to rule
lOb-5 that must be addressed by Supreme Court). But see Aldave, Misappropriation: A
General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFsTRA L. REV.
101, 119-21 (1984) (misappropriation theory properly reaches conduct that defrauds inves-
tors); Note, To Catch a Thief: The Misappropriation Theory and Securities Fraud, 70
MARQ. L. REv. 692 (1987) (misappropriation theory is proper standard for liability under
rule l0b-5).
15. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984) (Chiarella and Dirks bar private rule lOb-5 actions based on the misap-
propriation theory). See also infra text accompanying notes 133-35 (discussing Moss).
16. See, e.g., Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 411-12 (8th Cir.)
(no relationship of trust and confidence between parties requires dismissal of claim by
options trader for insider trading), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
17. See Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Laws Concerning Nonpublic
Information, 73 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1108-09 (1985) (federal securities laws were designed to
produce parity of information to protect investors).
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and (3) corporations involved in transactions that were the subject
of the material nonpublic information used in connection with
inside trading in that corporation's securities. Only members of
the first category-purchasers and sellers of equity securities-can
satisfy Chiarella's requirement for a private rule lOb-5 action for
insider trading, because they are the only ones owed the fiduciary
duty of disclosure. 8
Members of the other two categories, whose potential injury
from insider trading may be at least as great as those in the first
category, have fought to persuade courts to expand the reading of
Chiarella and Dirks to find that they have standing to bring a
securities fraud claim. 9 These efforts have been largely unsuccess-
ful because the fiduciary duty requirement is formalistic and looks
solely to the legal relationship between the parties, rather than the
effect insider trading has on investors. Moreover, courts differ as
to which purchasers or sellers are the proper plaintiffs. 20 Thus, as
interpreted by the courts, rule lOb-5 has not been flexible enough
to deal with developing transactions and securities.
Congress first addressed the question of private party standing
in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), which granted
options traders standing to sue persons trading in options while in
possession of material nonpublic information. 2' The options trader
provision, added to the Exchange Act as Section 20(d), eliminated
Chiarella's fiduciary duty requirement for options investors because
there is no relationship of "trust and confidence" between persons
trading in options.22 Congress adopted the options trader standing
18. See infra text accompanying notes 55-77 (discussing restrictive effect of Chiarella
on rule lOb-5).
19. See, e.g., Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 411 (options trader argued that Chiarella was
distinguishable when defendant was insider of company); FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d
981, 991 (7th Cir. 1988) (corporation whose information was misappropriated argued that
defendants, who were neither employees nor advisors of corporation, breached fiduciary
duty to corporation in violation of rule lOb-5).
20. Compare Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant liable to all persons who traded in open market in security
during same period), with Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1976)
(plaintiffs in open market transactions may not sue alleged inside trader because they
cannot prove defendant caused injury), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). In an often
cited concurrence in Fridrich, Judge Celebrezze proposed an alternative standard, permitting
plaintiffs that traded "contemporaneously" with the defendant to sue under rule l0b-5.
Id. at 326. Both the majority and concurrence in Fridrich expressed an aversion to permitting
a broad class of plaintiffs to sue because that would open a defendant to "Draconian"
liability for the losses of all traders in the market. Id. at 321, 323.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988).
22. See Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on
Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1290-91 (1984) (private cause of action for options
traders contrary to Chiarella-Dirks fiduciary duty rule).
[Vol. 39
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provision almost as an afterthought, 23 but that provision effectively
undermined any theoretical consistency Chiarella's fiduciary duty
principle may have had in limiting private party standing to only
those who are owed a duty of disclosure by the defendant.
On November 19, 1988, President Reagan signed into law the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(ITSFEA),2 which provides a private right of action to contem-
poraneous traders against any person trading "while in possession
of material, nonpublic information. ' 25 Damages are limited to the
insider's profit gained or loss avoided on the transaction, and are
offset by any SEC civil enforcement action penalties. 26 Congress
gave only perfunctory attention to private rights of action, and
ITSFEA's legislative history concerning insider trading is limited,
consisting primarily of anecdotal recitations of the breadth of
insider trading on Wall Street.27 In order to facilitate passage of
the bill, the House declined to define insider trading and eliminated
a provision extending the private right of action to corporations
23. The options trader standing provision was added by the Senate to a bill passed
earlier by the House, 130 CoNG. REc. S8911-14 (daily ed. June 29, 1984), and the House
accepted the Senate's amendment. There is neither a Senate nor a Conference Committee
report discussing § 20(d), and floor statements concerning the provision are sparse, with
no mention of how the provision can be reconciled with Chiarella. See id. at 8912-14
(remarks of Sen. D'Amato); 130 CoNG. REc. H7758-59 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (analysis
of Senate amendments repeats statements of Sen. D'Amato); see also Wang, A Cause of
Action for Option Traders Against Insider Option Traders, 101 HxRv. L. REv. 1056, 1058
& n. 11 (1988) (discussing legislative history of § 20(d)).
24. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988)).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1988).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(l) to (2). The limitation on damages also extends to controlling
persons, who cannot be liable on the basis of respondeat superior for the violations of
employees. Id. Controlling person liability to contemporaneous traders for insider trading
is governed by § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988). The House softened the blow of only providing contemporaneous
traders a cause of action by encouraging the federal courts to continue the trend of
expanding the classes of plaintiffs that can recover in rule lOb-5 actions. ITSFEA provides
that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any
person to bring an action to enforce a requirement of this title or the availability of any
cause of action implied from a provision of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (1988).
27. See House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, H. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-14 (1988) (reviewing
"Post-ITSA Wall Street Scandals") [hereinafter House ITSFEA Report].
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that did not trade contemporaneously but were otherwise damaged
by the violation. 28
Congressional expansion of the private right of action for options
traders and contemporaneous traders allows many private parties
to be in the same position as the government in bringing actions
against inside traders. Recent expansion of the right to sue, how-
ever, has not reached all securities holders that may be affected
by insider trading. Chiarella therefore remains an important limi-
tation on the scope of rule lOb-5 actions. -
By eliminating the fiduciary duty requirement as an element of
a private cause of action, and explicitly granting standing to
"contemporaneous" traders and other persons injured by insider
trading, Congress has embraced the assumption that more private
suits are desirable. Allowing more plaintiffs to sue may provide
greater coherence to the law of insider trading, but whether that
expansion will aid enforcement of the antifraud provisions or
merely encourage lawsuits that piggyback on government enforce-
ment efforts is an open question.2 9 Moreover, private actions will
raise procedural issues3° that may divert judicial attention from
more important questions of liability. By adopting a piecemeal
approach, Congress left the issue of private party standing unre-
solved. This gradual expansion of private rights of action for
insider trading does not settle exactly which parties remain subject
to Chiarella's fiduciary duty principle.
This Article examines the anomalous state of the law caused by
Congress's piecemeal approach to determining the scope of private
causes of action for insider trading and the resulting confusion
about which private parties may bring claims for insider trading.
The Article begins by discussing the basic requirements for private
party standing under rule lOb-5, the development of the fiduciary
duty principle, and the misappropriation theory applied by the
government in response to the limitations imposed by Chiarella.
In Part III, the Article analyzes which parties can bring claims,
28. See Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145, 151, 168 (1989) (Senate could not reach
consensus on definition of insider trading, and Rep. Dingell, chair of House committee
considering bill, strongly opposed any such definition; to preserve support for bill, House
committee deleted provision granting broad right of action to noncontemporaneous traders).
29. See, e.g., Adler & Cohen, Drexel Faces a Stockholder Suit Claiming Injury from
Wrongdoing Alleged by SEC, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1988, at 8, col. I (private suit against
Drexel Burnham Lambert piggybacking on SEC insider trading and market manipulation
complaint filed the previous day).
30. For instance, defining the class of "contemporaneous traders," which is necessary
in some private actions, will be time consuming and difficult.
[Vol. 39
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and which securities are subject to private actions for injury caused
by insider trading and other rule lOb-5 violations. The Article then
discusses how the courts have analyzed private rule lOb-5 actions
for different classes of securities and reviews the effect of Con-
gressional enactments on private plaintiffs' rights to bring claims.
Finally, the Article identifies the private parties who, although
adversely affected by an alleged violation, cannot bring an action
under rule lOb-5. The Article concludes with a discussion of the
anomaly caused by Congressional action in this area, which has
left crucial gaps in the private enforcement of laws prohibiting
insider trading.
II. STANDING LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATE RULE 10B-5 ACTIONS
For more than forty years, courts have recognized a private
cause of action for violations of rule lOb-5.3 The Supreme Court
has described this type of claim as a judicial oak sprouting from
a tiny acorn . 2 The elements of a private rule lOb-5 violation are
well established, and are drawn from the common law tort of
deceit:33 (1) a misstatement or omission; (2) materiality; (3) scienter;
(4) reliance; and (5) proximate cause. 34 Although the Supreme
Court gradually relaxed the materiality and reliance requirements,
it raised the standing requirements for a rule 10b-5 action, thereby
restricting the number of potential plaintiffs. 3
31. The private cause of action for violation of rule lOb-5 was first recognized in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
32. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("When
we deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn."). Cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond
peradventure.").
33. L. Loss, FUNDAMNTAlS OF SECURTIs RGU.ATION 809 (1983). Professor Loss
notes that courts have been loath to define "fraud" with any specificity, both in the
securities laws and the common law tort of deceit. Id. at 813.
34. Ross v. Bank South N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 728 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S.Ct. 1924 (1990); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986) (court also added
resulting damage as a sixth element).
35. One explanation for the liberalization of the proof requirements is that many
private securities fraud cases are class actions, typically involving relatively small individual
claims for losses. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1988) (class
action by former shareholders alleging material misstatements concerning ongoing merger
negotiations); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 466-67 (1977) (suit by minority
shareholders alleging breach of fiduciary duty in short-form merger); Blue Chip Stamps,
421 U.S. at 723 (class action by offerees alleging material misstatements concerning overly
pessimistic valuation of company). In order to facilitate class treatment of the claims,
courts eliminate or reshape those elements that are more individualistic, such as reliance,
in order to satisfy the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requirement that common
questions of-fact or law predominate.
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In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,36 the Supreme Court
held that when defendants fail to disclose material facts plaintiffs
need not prove reliance., Parties allegedly injured by such omissions
cannot prove that they would have traded differently had a proper
disclosure been made.17 Although Affiliated Ute involved a face-
to-face transaction, courts have expanded its application to include
open market transactions, when the parties never deal directly with
each other.3" The reliance element of a rule lOb-5 violation, there-
fore, merges into the materiality inquiry in claims alleging a failure
to disclose information.
In Basic v. Levinson,39 the Supreme Court held that, for all rule
10b-5 actions, "materiality depends on the significance the reason-
able investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented in-
formation. "40 Although the materiality element is fact-specific,
omitted information is almost always material in insider trading
cases when the insider's purchases or sales are made in anticipation
of the dissemination of information that will raise or lower the
stock's price.
The Supreme Court eroded the reliance element even more by
its narrow endorsement of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory in
Basic. Under this theory, there is a rebuttable presumption that
plaintiffs relied on material misstatements when the information
was disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed securities
market. 41 The relaxation of the reliance requirement in open market
cases also eases the burden of proving that the material misstate-
36. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
37. Id. at 153-54. Affiliated Ute involved a claim by members of a Native American
tribe against a bank and two of its employees who allegedly misled tribe members concerning
sales of stock in a tribal corporation by failing to inform them of certain important
information about the market for their stock. Id. at 152.
38. See Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Require-
ments in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435, 444-45 ("Based on
Affiliated Ute, courts accord plaintiff a presumption of reliance in nondisclosure cases and,
in so doing, shift the burden to defendant to prove plaintiff's nonreliance.").
39. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
40. Id. at 240. The Court noted that the materiality standard applies to both insider
trading cases, which involve a failure to disclose, and affirmative misrepresentation cases.
Id. n.18.
41. Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)). The
Court permitted plaintiffs to use the rebuttable presumption because direct proof of reliance
is difficult when trading occurs on a large securities market, and because adoption of the
presumption facilitates class treatment of the individual claims. Id. at 242-44. Basic notes
that "our understanding of Rule lOb-5's reliance requirement must encompass these
differences." Id. at 244. The dissent objected to the adoption of the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory as a novel construction of lOb-5, "based on contemporary microeconomic theory,"
which may be incorrect. Id. at 253 (White, J., dissenting).
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ment or omission proximately caused the plaintiff's loss. The
"fraud-on-the-market" theory assumes that material information
will be assimilated into the security's price, thereby causing the
damage suffered by the plaintiffs. 42
A. Limiting the Scope of Rule lOb-5 before Chiarella.
The Supreme Court's approach to the materiality and reliance
elements is based on the efficient market theory, which hypothe-
sizes that, within a very short period of time, the securities markets
digest information and adjust stock prices accordingly. 43 Infor-
mation is the currency of the securities markets. Even slight
advantages in the type of information available or the timing of
its dissemination can permit traders to reap enormous profits. Not
all such advantages involve fraud, however. Determining the legal
basis that requires a person to disclose nonpublic information
before trading or abstain from trading is the focus of the Supreme
Court's effort to limit rule lOb-5 actions for insider trading.
The Supreme Court reads the materiality and reliance require-
ments for a rule lOb-5 violation expansively, making it easier for
plaintiffs to recover. The Court's distrust of judicially created
private actions,44 however, has caused it to narrow the types of
conduct which may constitute a rule 10b-5 violation, thereby
limiting the class of potential plaintiffs. In Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,45 the Supreme Court restricted standing in
class actions to actual purchasers or sellers of the security at issue.
42. Id. at 247. "An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market
does so in reliance on the integrity of that price." Id.
43. Kuehner & Renwick, Comments on the Efficient Market-Random Walk Hypothesis,
in THE FinANcIAL ANALYST's HANDBOOK 1221 (2d ed. 1988). The theory has three variations:
(I) weak, which holds that a security's present price reflects all past information, but the
information does not predict future movements of the price; (2) semistrong, the most widely
accepted theory, which holds that current market prices instantaneously reflect all public
information available concerning a company; and (3) strong, which holds that current
market prices reflect all possible information about a company, both public and nonpublic.
Id. at 1226-28. In Basic, the Supreme Court accepted the semistrong form of the efficient
market theory, stating that "because most publicly available information is reflected in
market price, an investor's reliance on public material misrepresentations, therefore, may
be presumed." Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
44. See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (refusing
to imply a private cause of action for damages under § 206 of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979) (refusing to
imply a private cause of action under § 17(a) of the Exchange Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) (refusing to imply a private cause of action for unsuccessful
tender offerors under § 14(e) of the Williams Act).
45. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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The plaintiffs in Blue Chip were offerees of stock in a reorganized
corporation who alleged material misstatements related to overly
pessimistic projections in the prospectus. 46 The plaintiffs claimed
that, because of these pessimistic projections, they failed to pur-
chase the securities offered at a bargain price, and sought to
recover the value of the "lost opportunity. ' 47 The Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs' claim and adopted the Second Circuit's
Birnbaum rule,4 which limits the plaintiff class to actual purchasers
and sellers. Although the Court acknowledged the arbitrariness of
excluding nontransacting plaintiffs who were damaged by the
fraudulent statements,49 it found that limiting the plaintiff class to
parties that actually participated in transactions comported with
its view that a judicially created cause of action requires some
practical limitations on its scope. 50 Thus, the Supreme Court's
desire to limit standing to those who presented easily verifiable
claims won out over a more theoretically plausible standing test.
The Supreme Court put an additional gloss on the requirements
for a private rule lOb-5 claim in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green."1 Minority shareholders claimed that the terms of a merger
adopted by the majority shareholder violated federal securities laws
because the terms violated state fiduciary duty law. By emphasizing
the need to prove a separate deceptive act as a predicate to a
federal securities law claim, the Santa Fe Court rejected a broad
reading of rule 1Ob-5 that would have permitted plaintiffs to bring
claims in federal court for violations of state corporate law. 2
Although the minority shareholders of Santa Fe Industries asserted
that the majority shareholder breached the fiduciary duty of fair-
46. Id. at 726.
47. Id. at 726-27.
48. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952).
49. "The Birnbaum rule undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who have in fact been damaged
by the violations of Rule lOb-5, and to that extent it is undesirable." Blue Chip Stamps,
421 U.S. at 743. The Court noted three classes of potential plaintiffs excluded by the
actual purchaser or seller rule: (1) potential purchasers who decide not to acquire shares
because of a pessimistic representation or omission of favorable information; (2) actual
shareholders who do not sell because of an optimistic representation or a failure to disclose
unfavorable information; and (3) "shareholders, creditors and perhaps others related to an
issuer" whose investments lose value because of insider trading. Id. at 737-38. Plaintiffs
in the second category, however, are not affected by the Birnbaum rule to the extent that
they can bring derivative suits on behalf of the corporation to recover for any violation.
50. Id. at 748-49.
51. 430 U.S. 462, 468 n.6 (1977).
52. Id. at 476. The Court noted that if it permitted the claim under the federal
securities laws, "[t]he result would be to bring within [rule lob-5] a wide variety of
corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation." Id. at 478.
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ness, they did not allege that material misstatements or omissions
were made in connection with the merger. The Supreme Court
reviewed the language of rule lOb-5 and determined that it only
prohibits conduct involving "manipulation or deception." 53 There-
fore, absent some element of deception, misrepresentation, or
nondisclosure, breaches of state law fiduciary duties are not viol-
ations of federal law. 54
B. The Limits of Chiarella's Fiduciary Duty Principle
Although Blue Chip and Santa Fe limited private plaintiffs' right
to sue under rule 10b-5, it was not until Chiarella v. United States"
that the Supreme Court placed serious roadblocks in the path of
private parties seeking recovery for insider trading claims. In
Chiarella, the Supreme Court considered for the first time the
scope of rule 1Ob-5 in transactions by persons with knowledge of
material nonpublic information. The case was a criminal prose-
cution, but the Court's broad review of the policies underlying
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 makes it applicable as well to private
insider trading actions. Chiarella worked in the composing room
of a financial printer and had access to disclosure documents
related to takeovers prior to the public release of the information . 6
He deciphered the identities of five target companies and purchased
shares before the announcements, realizing a profit of approxi-
mately thirty thousand dollars. 57 Chiarella was convicted on sev-
enteen counts of violating Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 s
At trial, there was no dispute concerning the materiality of the
information or the fact Chiarella failed to disclose the information
prior to trading.59 The government's primary argument was that
the defendant's "secret conversion of confidential information"
and subsequent transactions based on that information worked the
requisite fraud to uphold the conviction. 6° At trial, the district
court charged the jury that Chiarella employed a scheme to defraud
if he "did not disclose ... material non-public information in
53. Id. at 473. ("The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to
prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception.").
54. Id. at 476.
55. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
56. Id. at 224.
57. Id.
58. In a settlement with the SEC, Chiarella consented to a permanent injunction and
disgorgement of the profits from his trading. Id.
59. Id. at 244-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
60. Id.
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connection with the purchases of the stock." ' 6' The United States
Supreme Court held the instruction was deficient because it did
not include the "nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner
to anyone other than the sellers. ' 62
The government's theory of liability was that all persons in
possession of material nonpublic information are under a duty to
either disclose the information or refrain from trading, 63 a position
that can be traced to the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts & Co .4
In Cady, Roberts, an administrative proceeding, the Commission
found that a registered representative of a broker-dealer violated
federal law by failing to reveal information that he had received
from a director prior to trading. 65 The SEC concluded that persons
with material nonpublic information were under an affirmative
duty to disclose the information or abstain from trading when two
factors were present:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."
Although the broker in Cady, Roberts was not an insider of the
company whose information he received, the SEC expanded the
scope of the antifraud prohibition to cover those who come into
possession of material nonpublic information from the corpora-
tion. 67
The Second Circuit followed the Cady, Roberts approach in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.68 The court applied the disclose-or-
abstain rule to corporate insiders and their tippees who traded
both stock and options while they had knowledge of test results
showing rich mineral and ore deposits over which the corporation
was seeking the right to mine. 69 The circuit court held:
61. Id. at 236.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 231.
64. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
65. Id. at 915 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 912. Cady, Roberts involved sales made immediately before the announce-
ment of a reduction in a dividend that caused the issuer's stock price to drop approximately
$6 per share. Id. at 909-10. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle:
A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAti. L. REV. 1, 8 (1982) (Commission's decision does
not discuss how the failure to disclose constitutes fraud, beyond describing the act as
inherently unfair).
67. "The facts here impose on [the broker] the responsibilities of those commonly
referred to as 'insiders.' " Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
68. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
69. Id. at 843-47.
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[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose
it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it ....
or he chooses not to do so must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securities concerned while such inside information remains undis-
closed.°
The Second Circuit's decision to extend rule lOb-5 to cover all
trading on material nonpublic information was based on the policy
decision that all investors in open market transactions should have
equal access to information.71 Texas Gulf Sulphur thus interpreted
rule lOb-5 as imposing liability based solely on possession of the
information prior to trading, without reference to the status of
the defendant or the relationship to the parties on the other side
of the transactions.
In Chiarella, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
the holding of Cady, Roberts-that a duty to disclose may apply
when a person with material information trades-but the Court
rejected the proposition that a duty of disclosure arises "from the
mere possession of nonpublic market information. 7 2 Relying on
Santa Fe's holding that rule lOb-5 only applies to fraud, that is,
manipulation or deception, the Supreme Court narrowed the ap-
plicability of rule lOb-5 to insider trading by holding that such
trading does not violate the antifraud provisions unless the defen-
dant is subject to an affirmative duty to disclose information
before trading. 7 According to the Court, the breach of a fiduciary
duty supplies the necessary fraud under rule 1Ob-5, and the source
of the disclosure duty was the "relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction. ' 7 4 Chiarella did not owe a duty
to disclose or refrain from trading because he was "a complete
stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market
transactions." 75 Thus, Chiarella could not be held liable for a
violation of rule 10b-5, and the Court dismissed the conviction. 76
70. Id. at 848.
71. Id. at 849.
72. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
73. Id. at 231.
74. "When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak." Id. at 235.
75. Id. at 233.
76. Chiarella's reliance on the fiduciary duty principle to limit the scope of rule lOb-
5 for insider irading is questionable in view of the common law's inconsistent treatment
of corporate fiduciary duties. The common law was split over whether corporate insiders,
i.e., directors and officers, owe a duty to shareholders when they trade in securities in
private transactions. Under the "majority" rule, the insider's duty ran only to the corpo-
ration, and therefore trading while in possession of material nonpublic information did not
create any liability to shareholders. See Aldave, supra note 15, at 104 (same); Seligman,
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Chiarella did not address whether the only persons owing a duty
of disclosure are the traditional corporate insiders, or whether
trading on an impersonal market can violate the duty of disclosure.
Instead, the opinion focused solely on Chiarella's failure to meet
the fiduciary duty standard. Until the Supreme Court specifically
determined who is charged with the duty of disclosure, Chiarella
could have been read to limit rule lOb-5 exclusively to traditional
insiders. Such a narrow interpretation would have left large cate-
gories of persons with access to material nonpublic information,
such as investment bankers or outside legal counsel, free to trade
without violating the antifraud provisions."
In Dirks v. SEC7 1 decided three years after Chiarella, the
Supreme Court addressed the question of who is charged with the
disclosure duty. In Dirks, a case involving "tipping" by an in-
vestment analyst,7 9 the Court affirmed its Chiarella analysis by
supra note 17, at 1091-98 (reviewing common law fiduciary duties of insiders to share-
holders). It is an open question, however, whether the "majority" rule was in fact anything
more than the most traditional, restrictive view of the fiduciary duties owed by insiders to
shareholders. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 725 (1986) (so-called
majority view gradually giving way); Langevoort, supra note 66, at 5 (trend of cases was
toward finding a fiduciary duty owed by insiders to shareholders).
In Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), the Supreme Court softened the "majority"
rule, imposing a duty on shareholders when "special circumstances" were present that
required a controlling shareholder to reveal certain facts prior to trading. Id. at 431-33
(director and 75% owner of the Philippines Sugar Estates Development Company purchased
the plaintiff's stock while concealing his identity through the use of an agent and a third-
party check). Conversely, the "minority" rule imposed on insiders a broad duty to disclose
material nonpublic information. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIs REGULATION
724 n.2 (1986); Langevoort, supra note 66, at 5 n.12.
In those jurisdictions that accepted either the minority or special circumstances rule, the
common law fiduciary duty of disclosure had two important limitations. First, the obligation
only bound officers and directors of the corporation, the traditional insiders. Second, the
duty appears to have applied only in face-to-face transactions and not to open market
transactions. See Seligman, supra note 17, at 1101 (discussing limitations of common law
prohibitions of insider trading). Common law actions for securities fraud based on non-
disclosure are of limited application to rule lOb-5 insider trading claims involving large-
scale transactions on national exchanges. Moreover, the common law has not defined with
any precision the duty owed by insiders. Nevertheless, Chiarella adopted the fiduciary duty
principle as the means of limiting the scope of rule lOb-5.
77. See Langevoort, supra note 66, at 17 (if read literally as establishing outer limits
of liability, Chiarella would lead to arbitrary and inconsistent results).
78. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
79. Dirks received information from a former officer of Equity Funding of America
that the company had engaged in fraudulent accounting practices that overstated its earnings
and assets. After investigating the allegations with the company, Dirks advised his clients
to sell their holdings. The SEC censured Dirks for violating the antifraud provisions by
not disclosing the information prior to tipping the clients that traded. In re Dirks, 47
S.E.C. 434, 449 (1981).
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rejecting the possession theory of liability for insider trading under
rule 1Ob-5, ° stating that the disclosure duty arises only when there
is a pre-existing fiduciary relationship.8 Dirks, however, expanded
the category of those who have a fiduciary duty to include "tem-
porary" insiders. The opinion addressed the issue of who may be
subject to rule lOb-5's insider trading prohibition in a footnote:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of
the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not
simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but
rather that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in
the conduct of the enterprise and are given access to information solely
for corporate purposes.
8 2
This approach was not based on the traditional principles of
corporation law, but was a pragmatic effort to provide flexibility
to Chiarella's limitation of those subject to the insider trading
prohibition. Moreover, the duty of these "temporary" insiders
may be passed on to tippees when the tipper breaches a duty by
disclosing the information for some direct or indirect benefit.83
The Chiarella and Dirks decisions had a profound impact on
the law of insider trading.8 For private parties, these decisions
80. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656-58.
81. Id. at 657-58. The Supreme Court rejected the SEC's renewed attempt to impose
an equal access rule for liability under rule l0b-5, stating that "mere possession of nonpublic
information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain; only a specific relationship
does that." Id. at 656 n.15.
82. Id. at 655 n.14.
83. "Thus, the tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the
insider's duty." Id. at 659 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 n.l (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). In order for the derivative fiduciary duty to apply, the tip
must constitute a breach of the insider's own duty. "[T]he test is whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal
gain, there has been no breach of a duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the
insider, there is no derivative breach." Id. at 662. For example, if attorneys working on a
hostile tender offer pass on material nonpublic information about the transaction to their
personal accountants in order to gain some benefit, even a nonmonetary benefit, and if
the accountants trade, only then will the accountants be subject to the Dirks disclosure
duty.
84. One response to Chiarella was the SEC's adoption of rule 14e-3, which prohibits
transactions in securities that are the subject of a tender offer on the basis of material
nonpublic information when the information has been acquired from the offeror, the issuer,
or any officer, director, partner, or employee of the offeror or issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-
3 (1989). Rule 14e-3 would reach trading similar to that at issue in Chiarella, but not in
Dirks, which involved nondisclosure of material corporate financial information. It is
interesting to note that rule 14e-3 imposes a duty to abstain from trading based solely on
possession of the information relating to a tender offer, a position twice rejected by the
Supreme Court as applicable to rule lOb-5. See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 14, at 67-68.
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made the possibility of recovery under rule lOb-5 problematic.
Chiarella phrases the fiduciary duty element in terms of corporate
insiders' obligation to place the shareholders' welfare before their
own. 5 In Dirks, the Court referred to the fiduciary duty owed by
"temporary" insiders as one owed to "shareholders. 8 6 Although
Dirks more flexibly defined who may owe a fiduciary duty, both
Chiarella and Dirks strictly defined who the duty is owed to-
namely, shareholders . 7
The Court's intention to restrict the application of rule lOb-5
will be successful if the class of potential plaintiffs is limited to a
corporation's shareholders. This approach is the culmination of
the trend to restrictively read rule lOb-5 as demonstrated by Blue
Chip, which created the actual purchaser-seller rule, and Santa Fe,
which limited rule lOb-5 to breaches of duty involving fraud. The
Court's analysis of rule lOb-5 has narrowed the range of potential
plaintiffs in private securities fraud actions to shareholders engaged
in transactions with corporate insiders who trade on information
received from the corporation.8" If a restrictive interpretation of
Chiarella is taken, however, the fiduciary duty principle fails to
take into account a substantial category of trading by persons with
material nonpublic information: trading by persons outside the
corporation with no prior "special relationship" to the corporation
or its shareholders.8 9
85. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
86. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
87. See Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 234-35 (glaring deficiency of Chiarella
and Dirks is limiting fiduciary duty to insiders and shareholders); Langevoort, supra note
66, at 34 (fiduciary duty rule applies when any fiduciary buys from or sells to its beneficiary);
Phillips & Zutz, supra note 14, at 70-71 (duty limited to issuer and its shareholders);
Seligman, supra note 17, at 1088 (Chiarella "emphasized that insider's fiduciary duty ran
to corporate stockholders.").
88. Professor Wang suggests that only the party in privity with the inside trading
defendant is owed a duty of disclosure and can bring a claim under rule lOb-5. Wang,
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed,
and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1270-71
(1981) (hereinafter Wang, Who Can Sue Whom]; Wang, A Cause of Action for Option
Traders Against Insider Options Traders, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1056, 1058 n.12 (1988)
(hereinafter Wang, A Cause of'Action for Option Traders]. Given both the Supreme
Court's goal in Chiarella of restricting the application of rule lob-5, and that the case does
not directly address private actions, Professor Wang's position is a logical interpretation
of the effect of the fiduciary duty principle on private rule 10b-5 claims.
89. See Seligman, supra note 17, at 1090 ("Chiarella and Dirks may exonerate outsiders
who trade on 'outside' information."); Note, Outsider Trading-Morality and the Law of
Securities Fraud, 77 GEo. L.J. 181, 189 (1988) (Chiarella and Dirks do not reach trading
in Carpenter).
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C. Avoiding the Limitations of Chiarella Under the
Misappropriation Theory
The SEC and the lower courts developed the misappropriation
theory of liability for insider trading under rule lOb-5 as a response
to Chiarella's restrictive approach. Under the misappropriation
theory, if persons wrongfully convert or misappropriate material
nonpublic information in violation of any fiduciary or other duty
of trust and confidence and trade or tip while in possession of
that information, they are liable under rule lOb-5. The theory
reaches those traders who receive valuable information concerning
corporate transactions but who lack the requisite fiduciary duty to
trading shareholders for liability under Chiarella. The misappro-
priation theory focuses on the means by which defendants acquire
the information rather than the relationship defendants have to
the corporation or its shareholders. Originally, the government
urged the theory as an alternative basis for liability in Chiarella.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's refusal to consider the mis-
appropriation theory, it is the means by which Congress expanded
the private right of action far beyond the limits imposed by
Chiarella.
The misappropriation theory is based on the concurring and
dissenting opinions in Chiarella. The government's primary argu-
ment in Chiarella was that the defendant violated rule lOb-5 by
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information. 9°
The government argued alternatively before the Supreme Court
that the defendant breached a duty to the acquiring corporation,
not the selling shareholders, and that this breach violated rule lOb-
5.91 The Supreme Court, however, refused to rely on this theory
to uphold Chiarella's conviction because the misappropriation the-
ory had not been presented to the jury.92
Nevertheless, five justices indicated varying degrees of acceptance
of the theory. In his concurrence Justice Stevens noted that a
"legitimate argument" could be made that a person's misappro-
priation of confidential information could constitute the requisite
90. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
91. Id.
92. The court noted:
"The jury was not instructed on the nature or elements of a duty owed by
petitioner to anyone other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury, . . . we will not
speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or
whether such a breach constitutes a violation of § 10(b)."
Id. at 236-37 (citations omitted).
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"fraud" for a rule lOb-5 violation. 93 In separate opinions, four
justices went even further, accepting the misappropriation theory
as a legitimate basis for a securities fraud action. Chief Justice
Burger's dissent articulated a broad theory that would impose an
affirmative disclosure duty on any person who misappropriates
information. 94 Indications from a potential majority of the Court
that the theory was an acceptable interpretation of "fraud" under
rule lOb-5, together with the Chiarella majority's refusal to rule
on the propriety of the theory, permitted the government to pursue
cases based on the misappropriation theory to reach transactions
beyond the scope of Chiarella's fiduciary duty requirement.
On the heels of Chiarella, the government used the misappro-
priation theory in a criminal insider trading case before the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States v. Newman, 9 the
indictment charged Newman, a securities broker, with securities
fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy arising out of his receipt of
information misappropriated by employees of Morgan Stanley &
Co. and Kuhn Loeb & Co., two investment banks.96 The infor-
mation related to proposed acquisitions by the investment bankers'
clients, and Newman purchased shares in the target companies.
The government drafted the Newman indictment to rely on the
misappropriation theory left open in Chiarella, charging that the
defendant aided and abetted violations of "the fiduciary duties of
honesty, loyalty, and silence owed to Morgan Stanley, Kuhn Loeb,
and clients of those investment banks." ' 97 Newman, as a tippee,
and the employees of the investment banks had, at most, a
93. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
94. The Chief Justice's dissent stated, "[A] person who has misappropriated nonpublic
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading."
Id. at 240. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, but accepted the Chief Justice's
position that "a person violates § 10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his
own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities." Id. at 239. Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, went
beyond Chief Justice Burger's position by finding liability for persons who had "access to
confidential information that the honest investor, no matter how diligently he tried, could
not legally obtain." Id. at 247 (emphasis in original).
95. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
96. Id. at 14-15. The information came from E. Jacques Courtois, Jr. and Adrian
Antoniu, who were employees of Morgan Stanley from 1972 through 1975, when Antoniu
moved to Kuhn Loeb. Id. Newman also passed information concerning the transactions to
two other persons. Id. at 15. The district court dismissed the indictment against Newman,
which charged securities fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy, on the ground that the securities
laws did not furnish adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. The mail fraud and
conspiracy allegations therefore failed as a matter of law if there was no securities law
violation. Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 16.
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fiduciary relationship with the acquiring corporations, whose in-
formation had been converted, but they owed no duty of disclosure
to the target corporations or their shareholders.
The Second Circuit initially rejected the district court's conclu-
sion that Newman did not violate the antifraud provisions because
neither the investment banks nor their clients were purchasers or
sellers at the time of the alleged inside trading. The circuit court
held that Blue Chip Stamp's standing limitation did not apply to
suits by the government, whether civil or criminal.9 Noting that
it "need spend little time on the issue of fraud and deceit," the
court determined that Newman and his co-conspirators had sullied
the employers' reputations and wronged the investment banking
clients who did not wish to have a target's stock prices artificially
inflated by "purloiners of confidential information."9 Finally, the
court rejected Newman's argument that the fraudulent acts were
not "in connection with" a purchase or sale of securities. Relying
on the Supreme Court's statement in Superintendent of Insurance
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.10° that the "in connection with"
element includes deceptive practices "touching" the securities, the
Second Circuit held that the defendant's "sole purpose in partic-
ipating in the misappropriation of confidential takeover informa-
tion was to purchase shares of the target companies."'' 1
The Newman court neither analyzed the misappropriation theory
nor determined whether it was reconcilable with Chiarella's restric-
tive approach to rule 10b-5. In fact, by stating that rule lOb-5
does not specifically require "that fraud be perpetrated upon the
seller or buyer of securities," 10 2 the Second Circuit adopted an
analysis distinct from Chiarella. Chiarella emphasized the "special
relationship" necessary before a person may be charged with a
fiduciary duty to shareholders; only upon the breach of that duty
by a fraudulent act does liability for insider trading arise under
the federal securities laws.' °3
98. The court stated that its concern was the scope of rule lOb-5, not a plaintiff's
standing to sue, and that "[i]t is only because the judiciary has created a private cause of
action for damages the 'contours' of which are not described in the statute, that standing
. . . has become a pivotal issue." Id. at 17 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
99. Id.
100. 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
101. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
102. Id. at 17.
103. The Second Circuit's statement in Newman concerning the fraud element of rule
lob-5 liability is even more questionable when viewed in light of Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held that the mere breach of
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Newman signaled the Second Circuit's willingness to jettison at
least one part of the "special relationship" test described in
Chiarella by substituting an employer for the trading shareholders
as the party defrauded in rule lOb-5 actions. The misappropriation
theory accepted in Newman permitted the government to bring
rule lOb-5 actions when the fiduciary relationship ran between the
defendant, as a tippee, and the corporation whose information
had been misappropriated, rather than between the defendant and
the shareholders, as required by Chiarella.'° After Newman, the
government could apply the misappropriation theory in actions
against persons who were not insiders of the corporation whose
securities were traded.
Three years after Newman, the Second Circuit upheld the mis-
appropriation theory in SEC v. Materia.105 The court reviewed an
SEC injunctive action against an employee of a financial printer
who deciphered the targets of possible tender offers and immedi-
ately purchased the targets' stock, earning a profit of over ninety-
nine thousand dollars.' ° The court contrasted the requirements for
a private lOb-5 cause of action, such as standing and fiduciary
duty, with those for a government action, in which the court found
the Chiarella limitations not applicable. The opinion noted that
the requisite fraud for a rule lOb-5 action is present when the
defendant's actions breach the integrity of the employment rela-
tionship. 107
Materia sought to interpose Chiarella, a criminal case with
obvious factual parallels, as a bar to the SEC's civil enforcement
action, arguing that a copyholder's fiduciary duty is no greater
a fiduciary duty in violation of state law without any fraud on the shareholders is not
actionable under rule lOb-5. Id. at 478. Taken together, Chiarella and Santa Fe can be
read to hold that liability for insider trading under rule lOb-5 occurs only when a breach
of a fiduciary duty encompasses a fraudulent act perpetrated on the party directly owed
the duty.
104. See Warren, supra note 14, at 1242-43 (discussing circularity of Newman's analysis
of breach of duty element).
105. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
106. Id. at 199-200. Materia was a "copyholder" whose job entailed reading drafts of
documents aloud to a proofreader. He traded in the stock of four tender offer targets
prior to the announcements by the offerors. Id. at 199.
107. According to the court:
Among a financial printer's most valuable assets is its reputation as a safe
repository for client secrets. By purloining and trading on confidences entrusted
to Bowne, it cannot be gainsaid that Materia undermined his employer's integrity.
Accordingly, we are driven to the conclusion that, by his misappropriation of
material nonpublic information, Materia perpetrated a fraud upon Bowne.
Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
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than the duty of a printer like Mr. Chiarella. The Second Circuit
adopted a restrictive view of Chiarella, however, essentially finding
it applicable only in private rule lOb-5 actions. The court, however,
did not explain why Chiarella should be limited in such a way.
The court simply stated that the fiduciary duty analysis "bears
only on the type of questions raised in a private suit for dam-
ages . * . .
The Materia analysis is dubious in at least two respects. First,
Chiarella was a criminal prosecution, not a private civil action.
The Supreme Court in Chiarella did not restrict its analysis to
private actions, as the Second Circuit seems to hold. Second, in
Materia, the Second Circuit rejected the limiting focus of Chiarella
by permitting a rule lOb-5 action by the government when no
relationship existed between the defendant and purchasers or sellers
of the securities, much less a "special" one. The court, however,
never specifically addressed this analysis in imposing liability on
Materia.
Materia and Newman proceeded on the theory that rule lOb-5
is violated by fraudulent acts that affect the integrity and confi-
dentiality of employers when information is not disclosed prior to
trading. In Materia, that breach of trust was self-evidently related
to transactions in the securities of the corporations that retained
a financial printer. Therefore, the Second Circuit had little trouble
finding that the fraud was "in connection with" the purchase or
sale of securities, despite the fact that the breach of duty did not
involve selling stockholders."° Similarly, the Newman court found
that the defendant's "sole purpose" in misappropriating the in-
formation from investment banks was to trade in the target com-
panies' securities, thereby fulfilling the "in connection with" element
for liability under rule 10b-5."10
In United States v. Reed,"' the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York refused to limit actions based
on the misappropriation theory to insider trading by employees.
Instead, the court expanded rule 10b-5 liability to cover a corporate
director's son who traded on nonpublic information received from
108. The defendant's reliance on Chiarella was "misplaced" because in SEC enforcement
actions there is no issue concerning who is owed a fiduciary duty. Id.
109. The court stated that "[tihe information Materia stole has no value whatsoever
except 'in connection with' his subsequent purchase of securities. The fraud perpetrated on
his employer was part and parcel of a larger design, the sole purpose of which was to reap
instant no-risk profits in the stock market." Id. at 203.
110. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981).
111. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
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his father." 2 The district court held that, under Newman and
Materia, a person may violate rule lOb-5 "even if they owed no
duty of disclosure to the sellers of the securities involved," 3
provided there is a breach of a duty of fidelity and confidentiality
rooted in a fiduciary or other relationship of trust between the
misappropriator and the person or entity owed the duty." 4
The misappropriation theory achieved its broadest reach in United
States v. Carpenter."5 Carpenter expanded the theory to cover
transactions by persons without any possible "relationship" to
either the shareholders or the corporation. Moreover, the infor-
mation involved was not confidential to the issuer. A Wall Street
Journal reporter, R. Foster Winans, leaked information to two
brokers prior to publication in the "Heard on the Street" column.
The scheme netted approximately $690,000. 16 According to Wall
Street Journal policy, all news was company property and non-
public information available in the course of employment was
confidential." 7 The Second Circuit found that the breach of the
duty of confidentiality and use of the information in trading prior
to publication constituted a misappropriation, and therefore the
trading violated rule lOb-5. The court noted that Newman and
Materia support the proposition that the misappropriation theory
reaches trading by outsiders, those with no pre-existing duty to
the corporation or its shareholders, and the court held that the
Wall Street Journal's policy of confidentiality imposed a "corollary
duty" under rule lOb-5 to disclose information or abstain from
trading."'
Carpenter marks the misappropriation theory's clear break fromChiarella. The opinion focuses not on the relationship between the
112. The defendant purchased call option contracts of Amax Inc. on the basis of
information concerning an upcoming merger he had learned from his father, a member of
Amax's board of directors. Id. at 690-91.
113. Id. at 703.
114. Id. at 712. See also United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In
Willis, the defendant, a psychiatrist, learned about an effort by Sanford I. Weil to become
chief executive officer of BankAmerica Corporation from his patient, Weil's wife. Id. at
271. Willis purchased BankAmerica stock prior to the announcement of Weil's interest in
the company, and made a profit of over $27,000. Id. The district court denied Willis'
motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that the misappropriation theory applies to
breaches of the duty of confidentiality a psychiatrist owes to a patient. Id. at 274.
115. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
116. Id. at 1026-27.
117. Id. at 1026.
118. Id. at 1034. The court's rationale is aptly summarized by the statement that
"investors are endangered equally by fraud by non-inside misappropriators as by fraud by
insiders." Id. at 1032 (footnote omitted). The court saw no reason to draw a legal distinction
based on the status of the misappropriator's relationship to the trading shareholders.
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defendant and the party owed the fiduciary duty, but on whether
the conversion of the information for personal gain constitutes a
breach of duty. The "corollary" duty under rule lOb-5 that the
court imposed on the defendants essentially re-creates the broad
possession theory of liability of Texas Gulf Sulphur, an approach
previously rejected by Chiarella and Dirks. The abstain-or-disclose
duty under Carpenter is triggered by the defendant's misappropri-
ation of information and is breached when the defendant uses it
in trading.
Carpenter's treatment of the "in connection with" element of
a securities fraud violation illustrates how the misappropriation
theory expands the reach of rule lOb-5. The Second Circuit ac-
cepted the trial judge's finding that the news columns had a
"significant market impact" and that investors would not have
purchased or sold at the prices they did had the misappropriated
information been publicly disseminated." 9 The opinion accepted a
"but-for" causation standard, which makes virtually any infor-
mational advantage related to a security, including information on
the market for the security, automatically "in connection with" a
purchase or sale. The misappropriation theory in Carpenter effec-
tively reduces the questions in a rule lOb-5 action by the govern-
ment to whether the inside trader breached a duty in acquiring the
information, regardless of the type of information or the defen-
dant's relationship to the corporate issuer, and whether the infor-
mation has value in the market.
The Supreme Court affirmed the securities fraud convictions in
Carpenter by a 4-4 vote. 20 Because the Court was evenly divided,
it did not discuss the propriety of applying rule lOb-5 when market
information is misappropriated from a corporation other than the
corporation whose securities are purchased. 12' The breadth of the
119. Id. at 1032 n.9.
120. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
121. Id. at 24. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the convictions for mail and
wire fraud, holding that those statutes include confidential business information. Id. at 28.
Governmental enforcement actions involving trading on market information generated in
the news media have not been limited to Carpenter. For example, a columnist for Business
Week recently consented to a permanent injunction and pled guilty to trading on information
slated to be released in future issues of the magazine. SEC v. Ruderman, No. 89 Civ. 3569
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 25, 1989), Lit. Rel. No. 12109. The SEC has also filed actions against
persons who received information from the printers of Business Week prior to the distri-
bution of the issues and who traded in securities discussed favorably in the magazine. SEC
v. Dillon, No. H-89-424 Civ. (D. Conn. filed July 11, 1989), Lit. Rel. No. 12157; SEC v.
Walters, No. 89 Civ. 5526 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 17, 1989), Lit. Rel. No. 12219.
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Second Circuit's decision has provoked extensive criticism. 122 The
opinion does not adequately address two issues. First, the infor-
mation used by the defendants was not corporate information,
and neither the reporter nor the Wall Street Journal owed a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders or any members of the investing
public. Carpenter cuts the misappropriation theory loose from the
limitation of Chiarella's fiduciary duty principle. The Second Cir-
cuit found liability under rule lOb-5 when there was no possible
relationship between the defendants and the corporations in whose
securities they traded. Moreover, Carpenter somewhat resurrects
Texas Gulf Sulphur's possession theory of liability by imposing a
disclosure duty on all persons who wrongfully receive or convert
material information relating to an issuer of securities and the
market for those securities, regardless of the source of the infor-
mation. 123
Second, the fiduciary duty breached in Carpenter was an em-
ployee's duty of confidentiality to his employer, not a traditional
corporate fiduciary duty. It is unclear how the breach of a private
employer's confidentiality policies can serve as the predicate for a
securities law violation, especially when the duty is not connected
to a corporation's nonpublic information or its securities.,24 More-
over, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the Wall Street Journal
may have been able to trade on the information at issue in
Carpenter without violating rule 10b-5, and that the duty owed to
the newspaper was not owed to the corporation or its sharehold-
122. See Note, The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity: Carpenter v. United States,
II GEo. MASON U.L. REV. 225, 238 (1988) (Carpenter divorces fraudulent act from investing
public protected by Exchange Act); Comment, The Misappropriation Theory: The Wrong
Answer to the Chiarella Question, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 701, 720 (1987) (Carpenter
stretches rule lOb-5 to cover every breach of duty even when securities only tangentially
involved); Note, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the Second Circuit
Gone Too Far?, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 78, 103 (1986) (Carpenter applies rule lOb-5
regardless of whether defendant has fiduciary relationship with market participants); Note,
United States v. Carpenter: An Inadequate Solution to the Problem of Insider Trading, 34
WAYNE L. REv. 1461, 1480-81 (1988) (Carpenter contradicts Chiarella by imposing a parity
of information rule).
123. "Bt one may not gain such advantage by conduct constituting secreting, stealing,
purloining or otherwise misappropriating material nonpublic information in breach of an
employer-imposed fiduciary duty of confidentiality. Such conduct constitutes chicanery, not
competition; foul play, not fair play." United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031
(1986).
124. The court asserted that the Wall Street Journal's confidentiality policy created a
"corollary duty" to abstain from trading, id. at 1034, but the opinion does not explain
the basis for this corollary duty, or how a private employment policy gives rise to a public
duty, the violation of which makes one subject to criminal prosecution.
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ers. 1 5 By transforming a private, contractual relationship into a
public duty, the Second Circuit allowed the government to enforce
the private employer's policies through criminal and civil enforce-
ment actions. This stands in sharp contrast to Santa Fe's refusal
to allow private plaintiffs to enforce state corporate fiduciary duties
through rule lOb-5 actions.
Carpenter is, however, a logical extension of the misappropria-
tion theory. In Newman and Materia, the government used the
theory to avoid the restrictions of Chiarella by pursuing enforce-
ment actions against noninsiders without reference to whether the
injured shareholders were owed a duty of disclosure by the trader.
The misappropriation theory focuses on the means by which the
defendant acquired the information, and whether there was fraud
in the acquisition, while the Chiarella fiduciary duty principle
focuses on the relationship between the defendant and the injured
shareholders. The information at issue in Carpenter is no different
from the information in Newman or Materia for purposes of the
misappropriation theory analysis. In each case, the defendants
breached a duty to their respective employers and engaged in
securities transactions without disclosing the nonpublic informa-
tion. Under the misappropriation theory, it is irrelevant whether
the information is "corporate" inside information or "outside"
information that relates to the market for the securities.
III. THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER RULE 1OB-5:
CONGRESS'S INCOMPLETE ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME CHIARELLA
As discussed above, the Supreme Court did not reconcile the
misappropriation theory with Chiarella's fiduciary duty analysis in
Carpenter. The development of: the misappropriation theory might
not have had as great an impact had it been confined to government
enforcement actions. Private parties, however, sought to use the
theory as a basis for damage claims against inside traders. The
Second Circuit rejected private rule lOb-5 actions based on the
misappropriation theory in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. & Co. ,126
despite permitting the government to bring a criminal action on
the same facts in Newman. Chiarella remained a substantial limi-
125. Id. at 1033. The court noted that "a reputable newspaper, even if it could lawfully
[trade), would be unlikely to undermine its own valued asset, its reputation, which it surely
would do by trading on the basis of its knowledge of forthcoming publications." Id. It is
unclear how this hypothetical conclusion justifies imposing criminal liability on an employee
under a statute that arguably does not apply to identical conduct if undertaken by the
employer.
126. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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tation on the standing of private parties to bring inside trading
cases under rule 1Ob-5 until 1988, when Congress granted private
parties standing to sue based on the misappropriation theory. 127
Congressional involvement in expanding the rights of private
parties has been based more on a desire to correct apparent
inequities in the administration of the law than a desire to construct
a consistent theoretical basis for private actions. The interplay of
Congressional enactments and judicial limitations has created a
confusing set of standing rules under which parties trading con-
temporaneously with the inside trader have standing to sue, while
the corporations whose information is used for insider trading do
not. This section of the Article reviews the classes of potential
private plaintiffs in rule 10b-5 actions, and the standing problems
Congress has left unresolved. The Article concludes that the cur-
rently existing anomalous structure for private actions should be
corrected.
A. The Rights of Equity Owners: Congress Eliminates
Chiarella's Limitations for One Class of Securities
Owners of common and preferred shares hold a direct interest
in the corporation.1 28 Under traditional corporate law principles,
shareholders are owed a fiduciary duty by the corporation's direc-
tors and officers. 29 According to Blue Chip and Chiarella, stock-
holders that buy or sell shares have the requisite direct relationship
with corporate insiders, and have standing to sue those insiders
that breach a duty by trading on the corporation's material non-
public information. Dirks's expansion of the category of insiders
subject to the disclosure duty of corporate fiduciaries to include
investment bankers and lawyers permits equity owners to reach
beyond traditional corporate fiduciaries to sue certain outsiders
who trade on corporate information.
Chiarella's fiduciary duty principle, however, severely limited
which plaintiffs could sue for rule 10b-5 violations. If the infor-
mation was held by a nonfiduciary, such as an investment banker
advising on a hostile tender offer for a target corporation, that
investment banker owed no fiduciary duty to the target's share-
127. Congress gave options traders standing to bring insider trading claims in ITSA
four years earlier, although it did not specifically adopt the misappropriation theory as a
basis for liability. See infra text accompanying notes 201-09.
128. FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 5083 (perm. ed. 1986).
129. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.10 (1980).
[Vol. 39
1990] INSIDER TRADING
holders, and hence was not a "temporary" insider under Dirks.30
Indeed, the information did not belong to the target corporation,
and the use of that information in trading the target's stock did
not breach any duty owed to the corporation or its owners.'
1. The Tangled Web of Rule 10b-5 Case Law: Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc. and Contemporaneous Traders
In Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc. ,1 a2 shareholders of a target
corporation sued an employee of an investment banking firm that
advised a potential offeror for insider trading in the target's stock
prior to the announcement of the tender offer.133 The transaction
at issue in Moss was one of the transactions involved in the
criminal indictment in Newman, in which the Second Circuit
adopted the misappropriation theory as a valid basis for a criminal
rule lOb-5 prosecution. Faced with a private cause of action,
however, the court refused to find that the offeror's investment
bank owed a fiduciary duty to the target's shareholders and flatly
130. See SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Musella, a law firm
office manager tipped the defendants concerning upcoming tender offers and corporate
reorganizations involving the law firm's clients. The court rejected the SEC's contention
that there was a breach of a fiduciary duty under Chiarella giving rise to a rule lOb-5
violation. The court stated:
The rather anomalous result of the Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella,
at least from. a policy perspective, is that an individual who obtains material
nonpublic information regarding a tender offer from the acquiring company,
rather than from the target company, is not subject to liability -at least under
the Chiarella rationale - if he or she chooses to capitalize on this information
by trading in the target company's securities.
Id. at 436. The court found the defendants liable, however, under the misappropriation
theory. Id. at 438-39. See also Moss, 719 F.2d at 14 (investment banker representing
acquiring corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to target corporation).
131. In Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second
Circuit rejected a lOb-5 claim by a shareholder who alleged that Morgan Stanley & Co.
was a fiduciary of a potential target corporation. The investment banker had been retained
to advise another corporation about a possible offer. The "inside information" related to
information received during confidential negotiations with the target, after which Morgan
Stanley & Co. acquired the shares. The court held that the investment bank received the
information as a result of arms length bargaining, not from a fiduciary relationship with
the target. Id. at 798. The court further held that one does not become a target corporation's
fiduciary solely upon receipt of confidential information. Id. at 799.
132. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
133. The plaintiffs in the private class action were shareholders of Deseret Pharmaceu-
tical Company who sold shares, prior to the announcement of a tender offer by Warner-
Lambert Corporation, at a premium of $10 per share. Id. at 8. Morgan Stanley served as
an adviser to Warner-Lambert. A member of the investment banker's mergers and acqui-
sitions department tipped others, who purchased 11,700 shares of Deseret Pharmaceutical
immediately before the announcement. Id.
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rejected the argument that private parties could sue for insider
trading violations based on Newman's misappropriation theory.'34
The Second Circuit never satisfactorily explained why private
rule lOb-5 claims are not cognizable under the misappropriation
theory. Instead, the court tersely stated that "[n]othing in our
opinion in Newman suggests that an employee's duty to abstain
or disclose with respect to his employer should be stretched to
encompass an employee's duty of disclosure to the general pub-
lic."' Moss, therefore, became a barrier to private rule lOb-5
actions for those injured stock purchasers or sellers who could not
otherwise establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship with
the defendant.
A corollary standing issue beyond the scope of Chiarella and
Dirks is present in lOb-5 actions: which shareholders, if any, who
traded the issuer's securities can recover under rule lOb-5? Appel-
late courts were originally split on this question. Some courts held
that any purchaser or seller of the shares subject to the fraudulent
trading could sue, but others ruled that only those who traded
directly with the inside trader could recover damages. In Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,36 a case decided
long before Chiarella, purchasing shareholders sued a broker and
its customers for selling shares prior to the public announcement
of a negative earnings report. The broker received the information
from a corporate client and leaked it to a group of institutional
investors. The investors sold approximately 165,000 shares of the
security at issue over the three days prior to the release of the
information.'37 In determining whether the broker and its clients
owed a duty to the plaintiff shareholders, the Second Circuit stated
that the duty runs "not only to the purchasers of the actual shares
sold by defendants (in the unlikely event they can be identified)
but to all persons who during the same period purchased ...
stock in the open market with knowledge of the material inside
information."'3 The court specifically rejected privity as a prereq-
uisite for private rule lOb-5 actions because all persons in the
market are affected adversely by such inside trading, not just those
134. Id. at 13. The Second Circuit adopted the district court's holding that private
plaintiffs cannot "piggyback" on an employee's fiduciary duty to the employer as the basis
for a rule lOb-5 claim. Id. (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347,
1353 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
135. Id.
136. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 231-32.
138. Id. at 237.
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who fortuitously trade with the defendant.3 9 The opinion did not,
however, discuss the limitations applicable in determining what
constitutes the "same period" in private party claims.
Two years later, and still before Chiarella, the Sixth Circuit
adopted a more restrictive privity requirement for private inside
trading claims in Fridrich v. Bradford.140 Fridrich involved pur-
chases by defendants who received nonpublic information con-
cerning tender offer negotiations. The defendants acquired their
stock in late April 1972 and the information was publicly disclosed
on June 29, 1972. Two plaintiffs purchased in May 1972 and the
others had acquired the stock five years earlier.' 4 ' The court
rejected Shapiro's approach permitting recovery for all persons
who traded during the same period as the defendants, holding
instead that the defendants did not cause any injury to plaintiffs
with whom they did not deal directly. 42 The decision avoided the
overwhelming damages that defendants could face if they were
liable to all persons on the other side of transactions in the security
on impersonal markets.143
In a widely noted concurrence, Judge Celebrezze proposed lim-
iting the class of plaintiffs in insider trading cases to those trading
"contemporaneously" with the defendant. Contemporaneous trad-
ers would be owed a duty of disclosure by the insider because they
were directly affected by the fraudulent transactions, even in
trading on an impersonal market.' The concurrence fails, how-
ever, to define "contemporaneous," noting only that "[w]hen the
insider ceases trading, the informational imbalance ends and the
market returns to its normal state.' ' 4 5  ,
139. Id. at 239. In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980), the
court limited the defendant's liability for inside trading to the gain realized, because
requiring the defendant to compensate all persons trading at the time of the violation
would impose liability "out of all proportion to the wrong committed." Id. at 170-72.
140. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
141. Id. at 309-11.
142. Id. at 320. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the defendants had not induced the
plaintiff's sales, and that there was no relationship between them because the transactions
were executed on an impersonal market. Id. In rejecting the private party claims, the court
noted that the remedies available to the government and private parties under rule lOb-5
need not be coextensive when allowing private claims would lead to "an unjust and
unworkable result." Id.
143. The majority opinion notes at the outset that one defendant only purchased five
shares, earning a profit of less than $53.00. The court stated that its decision was to avoid
"Draconian liability" by limiting private rule lOb-5 actions. Id. at 308-09.
144. Id. at 326-27.
145. Id. In Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981),
the court adopted Judge Celebrezze's position, stating that "[alny duty of disclosure is
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2. Congress Creates a Private Right of Action Based on the
Misappropriation Theory
Congress eliminated the restrictive standing requirements im-
posed on private stockholders in rule lOb-5 actions for insider
trading in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).' 46 Section five of ITSFEA created a new
Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.147 Section
20A provides that persons trading on material nonpublic infor-
mation are liable to persons trading "contemporaneously" in
"securities of the same class.' ' 4 Liability, however, is limited to
the amount of the profit or loss avoided, less any amounts dis-
gorged in connection with SEC civil enforcement actions. 149
Although Section 20A creates an express cause of action against
inside traders, the Act does not define the term "contemporane-
ous." The House Report accompanying the Act states, "The bill
does not define the term 'contemporaneous,' which has been
developed through case law."' 150 The House Report cites three
decisions in a footnote, Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications,5'
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc.,152 and
O'Conner & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,' as ex-
amples of cases that have applied a contemporaneous trader rule.14
None of the cited cases, however, provide any guidance for deter-
owed only to those investors trading contemporaneously with the insider; non-contempo-
raneous traders do not require the protection of the 'disclose or abstain' rule because they
do not suffer the disadvantage of trading with someone who has superior access to
information." Id. at 94-95.
146. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
148. Id. Section 78t-l(a) states:
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of
securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such violation
is based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a
purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
149. Id. § 78t-l(b)(1) to (2).
150. INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP.
No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6043, 6064 [hereinafter HousE ITSFEA REPORT].
151. 648 F.2d 88 (2d. Cir. 1981).
152. 495 F.2d 228 (2d. Cir. 1974).
153. 559 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
154. HousE ITSFEA REPORT, supra note 150, at 27 n.22.
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mining the meaning of "contemporaneous" beyond the factual
conclusion in each decision. The courts that have considered the
issue have not agreed on a principle for determining when the
period of contemporaneous trading opens and closes. '
The congressionally-created private cause of action for an un-
certain class of potential claimants will require courts to expend
considerable effort to determine the preliminary issue of who is
eligible to sue before reaching the question of liability. Moreover,
Congress ceded to the courts virtually complete discretion to define
the class of contemporaneous traders, which, in turn, may lead to
inconsistent results. A court adopting a restrictive approach can
interpret "contemporaneous" to include only persons trading dur-
ing the same hour or on the same day if the trading occurs, as it
frequently does, over a period of time, while another court may
adopt a more expansive approach.'5 6
Congress limited potential liability to contemporaneous traders
by restricting the amount of damages to the defendant's gain or
loss avoided. Nevertheless, the damage limitation does not rectify
the problem of determining who may take advantage of the private
right of action. By limiting damages, Section 20A lessens the
incentive for private parties to sue because the amount of damages
sustained by individuals is likely to be small compared to the class
of contemporaneous traders. Thus, what appears to be a broad
grant of a private cause of action in Section 20A is a right that
may be narrowly interpreted and may allow only a negligible
recovery compared to the loss suffered by contemporaneous traders.
By restricting liability to purchasers or sellers of securities of
the "same class," Section 20A does not extend the inside's liability
to claims by persons transacting in all securities related to the
corporation that may be affected by the trading, such as market
index securities that include the corporation in the basket of stocks
tracked by the index. Section 20A does expand liability, however,
155. Wang, The "Contemporaneous" Traders Who Can Sue an Inside Trader, 38
HASTINGs L.J. 1175, 1178-84 (1987). Professor Wang reviewed the various time periods for
which courts consider trading to be contemporaneous with the inside trader. He noted that
"[t]rading one month after the inside trade is too long; unclear is whether a day or even
an hour also would be too long." Id. at 1177.
156. In Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 540 F. Supp. 667 (D. Mass. 1982), the court found
that sales of stock made two and seven trading days after the insider's transaction were
"outside of the period of insider trading," but sales of call options on the same day as
the insider's transaction could be pursued. Id. at 671. In O'Conner & Associates, 559 F.
Supp. at 802, the court allowed class claims covering five trading days during the period
the defendants purchased call options.
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to cover securities that previously may not have been subject to
private rule lOb-5 actions, such as corporate bonds.'57
More important than expressly codifying a private cause of
action for contemporaneous traders, Congress expanded the class
of plaintiffs who can bring claims against inside traders. The
House Energy and Commerce Committee expressly rejected Moss
v. Morgan Stanley Inc. and granted contemporaneous traders the
right to rely on the misappropriation theory for private insider
trading actions. According to the House ITSFEA Report, Moss
"is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act,"
and the misappropriation theory is an appropriate basis for rule
lOb-5 actions against inside traders.' After reviewing the history
of insider trading cases and noting the limitations of Chiarella and
Dirks and the development of the misappropriation theory, the
Report concluded that the conduct at issue in Carpenter "should
be encompassed within Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."'' 9 By en-
dorsing Carpenter, Congress approved the broadest application of
the misappropriation' theory. Moreover, Congress's explicit rejec-
tion of Moss extends to private plaintiffs a right to pursue claims
for insider trading that is coextensive with the government's right
to sue. Section 20A allows private claims against any person whose
trading on wrongfully converted information violates the federal
securities laws, regardless of whether the defendant is a corporate
fiduciary under Chiarella.
Section 20A renders Chiarella superfluous for many private
insider trading cases because plaintiffs need not prove they have
a direct relationship with the transacting defendants. Instead,
defrauded purchasers or sellers must demonstrate only that their
trading was contemporaneous with the defendant's and that the
defendant acquired the material nonpublic information by breach-
ing some fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence.
Section 20A endorses the misappropriation theory developed by
the courts. Congress enacted a legal theory of liability, however,
that only vaguely specifies what conduct triggers rule lOb-5. The
misappropriation theory requires a breach of duty, but the courts
have not specified all relationships giving rise to duties that, if
breached, form the basis for liability. Thus far, employment and
familial relationships have been the basis for the breach of duty
element in governmental rule lOb-5 actions. That does not, how-
157. See infra text accompanying notes 224-25 (discussing bondholders' standing to
bring insider trading claims under § 20A).
158. HousE ITSFEA REPORT, supra note 150, at 26.
159. Id. at 10.
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ever, exhaust the range of relationships involving a duty of trust
and confidence that may be breached in acquiring inside infor-
mation. Section 20A, therefore, grants private parties the right to
pursue claims based on a theory in which a key component has
only partially been articulated. As a result, Congress has elevated
a developing concept into a basis for expanded civil liability without
providing any clear guidelines for that development.160
B. Options Trader Standing: An Incomplete Remedy
Section 20A is not limited to transactions in common stock, but
permits a claim against inside traders by all persons trading con-
160. The House ITSFEA Report notes that "the Committee believed that the court-
drawn parameters of insider trading have established clear guidelines for the vast majority
of traditional insider trading cases, and that a statutory definition could potentially be
narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law." Id. at 11.
Congressional failure to provide any guidance, however, means that those persons whose
conduct does not fall within those "clear guidelines" will continue to risk civil and criminal
liability, without any fair warning that their actions violated rule lOb-5.
One interesting aspect of the Congressional expansion of private rights of action is that
individuals can now bring claims under § 20A to the same extent as the government.
Nevertheless, the government relies on the misappropriation theory, a judicial interpretation
of rule lOb-5, which received only tenuous support from the Supreme Court in Carpenter.
Despite Congressional enshrinement of the misappropriation theory for private claims in
ITSFEA, the Supreme Court could decide that, as presently drafted, rule lOb-5 only permits
actions by the government when there is a breach of a fiduciary duty within the meaning
of Chiarella. Or, the Court could adopt a more limited approach and force the government
to abandon the misappropriation theory in cases factually similar to Carpenter, when there
is no corporate information or "temporary" insider involved in the transactions.
If the Supreme Court were to restrict the misappropriation theory as a basis for rule
lOb-5 actions, an anomalous situation could result. If § 20A provides an independent right
of action for insider trading, then private parties would be able to rely on § 20A to bring
actions based on the misappropriation theory, which has been developed in governmental
enforcement actions, without reference to any potential limitations the Supreme Court may
impose on the application of the misappropriation theory in rule lob-5 actions. The
government, however, could not pursue the same case if the Supreme Court were to limit
the use of the theory in rule lOb-5 actions. For example, if the Supreme Court prohibits
rule lob-5 actions against non-insiders trading on market information, such as the infor-
mation at issue in Carpenter, contemporaneous sellers of the common stock could sue
under § 20A because the defendant traded on material nonpublic information that had
been misappropriated. The SEC, however, would be precluded from bringing a civil
enforcement action. The only possible criminal liability would be for mail or wire fraud.
By focusing on the rights of private parties in ITSFEA, Congress has created the odd
prospect that private parties conceivably may have greater power through § 20A than the
government has under rule lob-5 to enforce the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
Congressional action would become necessary to correct the potential imbalance in the
rights of the government and private parties, by either amending rule lOb-5 to include the
misappropriation theory, or restricting private rights to conform to the government's power
to enforce the securities laws. Given the Congressional enthusiasm for the misappropriation
theory, the former course appears to be the more likely result.
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temporaneously in the "same class" of securities. The securities
subject to Section 20A include stock options and market index
options. Derivative securities are widely traded on national ex-
changes, and stock options of a corporation are frequently a vehicle
for transactions by persons with inside information. 16  Derivative
securities, however, fall outside the traditional category of equity
securities, and Chiarella's fiduciary duty requirement, which fo-
cuses on the duty owed to shareholders, created a loophole in rule
lOb-5's coverage of options.6 2 Prior to the passage of Section 20A
in 1988, Congress sought to close the loophole by granting options
traders standing to bring insider trading claims under rule lOb-5.
Nevertheless, Chiarella continued to affect the analysis of rule
lOb-5 claims by options traders, and Congressional and judicial
treatment of derivative securities has created uncertainty regarding
options traders' standing to bring rule lOb-5 actions.
1. Chiarella's Effect on Options Trader's Standing to Sue for
Insider Trading Violations
A stock option is a contract granting the holder of the option
the right to purchase (call) or sell (put) the underlying security in
a trade with the party on the other side of the contract, the writer
or seller of the option.6 3 Unlike a futures contract, which is a
binding agreement to deliver an item on the contract settlement
date, an option gives the holder the right, but not the duty, to
exercise the contract and buy (or sell) the security at any time
prior to the contract's expiration. 164 Common stock option con-
tracts, which usually represent one hundred shares of the under-
lying security, are traded publicly on national exchanges. 6s
Stock option contracts are "derivative" in the sense that their
value is based on the underlying security. The price of common
161. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 833 F.2d
1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 101 (1988) (defendants purchased 1855 out-of-
the-money call option contracts immediately prior to announcement of hostile tender offer);
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690-91 (S.D.N.Y.) (defendant purchased 500 out-
of-the-money call option contracts prior to a merger announcement), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477
(2d Cir. 1985). Reed was acquitted after trial. Berton, Reagan Ex-Adviser Cleared of
Charges of Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1985, at 12, col. 2.
162. See Langevoort, supra note 66 at 42 (narrow reading of Chiarella creates a loophole
in applying rule lOb-5 to options); Wang, Who Can Sue Whom, supra note 88, at 1286
(no fiduciary duty owed to seller of call option under Chiarella).
163. Fabozzi, Introduction to Option Contracts, in HANDBOOK oF FInANcIL MARKETS:
SECURITIES, OPTIONS AND FUTUREs, 549-50 (2d ed. 1986).
164. Id. at 550.
165. Id. at 551.
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stock options incorporates the intrinsic value, the difference be-
tween the price of the underlying security and the exercise price,
and the premium, an amount over the intrinsic value that investors
will pay based on the option's time value, the volatility of the
market, and the demand for the option. Each option contract has
an expiration date and a strike price, the price at which the
underlying security will be traded if the option is exercised prior
to expiration. The issuer of the underlying security does not issue
the options and does not control the number of options available
in the market. Instead, listed options are issued and guaranteed
by the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC), which serves as an
intermediary between purchasers and sellers in settling contracts
and making payments; therefore, the contracting parties never deal
directly with each other.'6
Prior to 1973, options were sold only in the over-the-counter
market in negotiated, face-to-face transactions. At that time op-
tions did not have standardized terms. The SEC authorized exper-
imental trading of options on the Chicago Board of Exchange in
April 1973.167 An SEC study noted that:
[tlo those who understand . . . [options], they may offer an alternative
to short term stock trading at lower commission costs and a smaller
commitment of capital . .. [and] also provide a means for shifting the
risk of unfavorable short term stock price movements from owners of
stock who have, but do not wish to bear, those risks, to others who
are willing to assume such risks in anticipation of possible rewards from
favorable price movements."
Unfortunately for those trading in the options market, Chiarel-
la's fiduciary duty analysis created a substantial, albeit unintended,
loophole in the law of insider trading. The parties trading in
options have no direct relationship to the corporate issuer of the
underlying common stock because the OCC, not the corporation,
is the issuer of the option contract. Thus, there is no fiduciary
relationship between the purchaser and the writer or seller of the
option. 169
166. Seligman, The Structure of the Options Market, 10 J. CORP. LAW 141, 145-46
(1984).
167. In re Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 9985,
[1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,212 (Feb. 1, 1973).
168. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG. lST
SEss., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMM. 1 (Comm. Print 1978).
169. See Seligman, supra note 166, at 145 ("In a formal sense, the OCC issues each
option. The holder of the option looks to the OCC, and not an individual writer, for
performance in the event the option is exercised.").
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The options trader may arguably be an "incipient" shareholder,
similar to a purchaser of stock who acquires the security while an
insider is selling but who does not have a pre-existing relationship
with the corporation:170 Most option contracts, however, are not
exercised, and the contract does not require that the party to the
contract acquire or dispose of the shares. The options trader does
not enter into a relationship with the corporation when the deriv-
ative security is traded. Although Chiarella imposes the formalistic
requirement of a pre-existing fiduciary duty before liability attaches
for insider trading under rule lOb-5, options traders do not have
such a fiduciary relationship. Therefore, trading in options while
in possession of material nonpublic information does not breach
a disclosure duty under Chiarella.171
The arbitrariness of the fiduciary duty analysis in the context
of options becomes clear when a corporate insider, such as a
director, receives information about an impending offer for the
company and purchases out-of-the-money call options prior to the
announcement of a tender offer at a price above the option strike
price. The value of the option is based on the underlying stock
price, and the cost of acquiring out-of-the-money call options is
only the small amount of the premium. If the common stock price
then moves above the strike price in response to the offer, the
value of the option will iicrease accordingly. The potential profits
from such a transaction can be enormous 72 because options are
significantly less expensive than acquiring the equivalent number
of shares. Under Chiarella, however, the seller of the call options
could not sue the insider because, although the director clearly
breached a fiduciary duty to the corporation, the director did not
owe that fiduciary duty to the option writer.
A corollary issue is whether an options trader can sue an insider
trading in the underlying securities. The argument in favor of
allowing such a suit is that, because options are derivative and
transactions in the stock affect the value of the options, options
170. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961) ("We cannot accept [the]
contention that an insider's responsibility is limited to existing shareholders and that he
has no special duties when sales of securities are made to non-stockholders.").
171. See Langevoort, supra note 22, at 1290 n.82 (no fiduciary relationship exists prior
to exercise of option).
172. For example, in United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 691 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
773 F.2d 777 (2d. Cir. 1985), the defendant purchased 500 out-of-the-money March 50 call
option contracts for the common stock of Amax Inc., at a total cost of $3,346.76, the day
before Amax announced it would be taken over in a friendly merger. After the announce-
ment, the value of the options rose dramatically, and the defendant sold the contracts at
a profit of approximately $431,000, a healthy return on a two-day investment.
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traders should not be treated differently from shareholders when
they have been harmed by violations of rule lOb-5.171 In Laventhall
v. General Dynamics Corp. , 74 the Eighth Circuit considered a
securities fraud suit filed by a seller of call options who claimed
the defendant corporation's purchases of common stock prior to
the announcement of a stock split and dividend violated rule lOb-
5. The court held that, under Chiarella, there is no relationship
of trust and confidence between options traders and the corporate
issuer of the underlying securities, and therefore holders of the
options may not bring a private lOb-5 action.17  Laventhall further
held that plaintiffs must show a "transactional nexus" between
their trading and the defendant's trading to prove that they suffered
a loss traceable to the inside trading. 76
By adopting the "transactional nexus" test for standing, the
Eighth Circuit limited the plaintiff class to those traders directly
harmed by the use of the inside information without requiring that
the plaintiffs prove they were in privity with the defendant. The
plaintiffs in Laventhall, as options traders, were only indirectly
affected by the defendant's stock purchases, and "[tihe defendant's
alleged illegal gain [was] remote and totally speculative in relation
173. See Langevoort, supra note 66, at 42 (little basis for distinguishing options and
equity markets for disclosure purposes); Note, Private Causes of Action for Option Investors
Under SEC Rule Ob-5: A Policy, Doctrinal, and Economic Analysis, 100 HARv. L. REV.
1959, 1964 (1987) (option holders deserve compensation, and damages should be allocated
pro rata between stock and options traders) [hereinafter Note, Option Investors]; Note,
Securities Regulation for a Changing Market: Option Trader Standing Under Rule lOb-5,
97 YAt L.J. 623, 638-39 (1987) (shareholders and options traders have same functional
relationship to corporation and insider trading affects both markets) [hereinafter Note,
Option Trader Standing].
174. 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
175. Id. at 411-12 ("There simply existed no relationship of trust and confidence
between the parties."). One commentator criticized Laventhall's reliance on Chiarella to
limit the plaintiff class in rule lOb-5 actions, asserting that the fiduciary duty principle only
limits the defendant class, and that if one is an insider under Chiarella, the person is liable
for any trading on nonpublic information. Note, Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corpo-
ration: No Recovery for the Plaintiff-Option Holder in a Case of Insider Trading under
Rule lob-5, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 780, 787-88, 794-95 (1984). The author argues that options
traders are "like the purchaser of a stock," and therefore are owed a duty of disclosure
by insiders. Id. at 796 (emphasis in original).
Chiarella held that there must be a duty of disclosure arising from a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction before liability for insider trading could
arise. Although Chiarella is a criminal case, not a private rule lOb-5 action, the Supreme
Court's analysis is clear that the fiduciary duty must run between two parties, one of which
must be the corporation. Defendants who simply are trading the corporation's securities
are not automatically liable to any person for violation of rule lOb-5.
176. Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 412.
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to the plaintiff's loss in a different market . . . ."I' The court's
decision was colored by its view of options, which do "not
represent contribution of capital to the corporation," and its view
that the options market is only indirectly affected by transactions
in the common stock.'78
Laventhall correctly applied Chiarella because the fiduciary duty
principle excludes standing for options traders, who do not have
any relationship of trust and confidence with the corporation or
its insiders at the time of the transaction in the derivative security. 79
The Eighth Circuit did not, however, need to move beyond the
Chiarella duty analysis to consider whether the plaintiff suffered
any loss to decide the case. The court's assertion that options
traders cannot show a "transactional nexus" with the defendants
ignores the economic reality that options are derivative securities
whose value is directly affected by transactions in the underlying
security. Laventhall assumed that "[h]ad plaintiff been contem-
poraneously trading in the same market, that is, buying and selling
common stock at the same time defendant was trading," then a
"transaction nexus" existed because the plaintiff could trace a loss
to the inside trading.' 80 If trading stockholders suffer a loss,
177. Id.
178. Id. at 411. The court concluded that the parties "in no way can be said to have
been 'trading' With one another." Id. at 414.
179. Despite Chiarella's limiting effect on private party standing for inside trading
cases, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in O'Connor
& Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (O'Connor
1), permitted an options seller to sue tippee-purchasers of options for violation of rule lOb-
5 in the same transaction at issue in United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.)
rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). Although the O'Connor I court noted that an options
trader has no fiduciary relationship with the corporation, it held that a private party can
sue under the misappropriation theory when the defendants transacted in options rather
than common stock. O'Connor 1, 529 F. Supp. at 1185.
O'Connor I was decided before the Second Circuit barred private actions based on the
misappropriation theory in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). Nevertheless, the court in O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (O'Connor II), permitted the
plaintiff to continue the suit after Moss because it determined that Moss did not apply.
O'Connor II, 600 F. Supp. at 704-05. The O'Connor II court distinguished Moss on the
basis that the information in that case did not come from an insider of the target, while
the information in O'Connor I was alleged to have come from corporate insiders. Id. at
704. The Court's attempt to distinguish Moss on its facts is specious because the status of
the tipper is irrelevant to the analysis of the fiduciary relationship of options traders to
the corporation. The misappropriation theory was squarely rejected in Moss for all private
claims. Moss, 719 F.2d at 16.
180. Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1983).
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however, options traders on the same side of the transactions will
also be affected, an economic fact Laventhall ignored. 8'
2. Options Trader Standing to Sue for Material Misstatements:
A Misapplication of Chiarella
Courts may be averse to permitting options traders to sue for
violations of rule lOb-5 because many view options as risky,
inherently speculative investments that are unrelated to the tradi-
tional function of equity securities as a source of capital for the
issuer. 8 2 This view, coupled with the fiduciary duty analysis of
Chiarella, has prompted some courts to deny options traders
standing to bring rule lOb-5 claims for affirmative misstatements
by corporations and their officers and directors that affect the
value of its securities. Allegations of material misstatements involve
issues distinct from insider trading claims under rule 10b-5. The
key issues in misstatement cases are the materiality of the state-
ments, and, in some instances, whether there is a duty to provide
additional information to clarify misleading or incomplete original
statements. Unlike insider trading cases, these securities fraud
actions involve an affirmative corporate act. There is no question
that the corporation owes a duty of disclosure to its shareholders.
Nevertheless, some courts misapply Chiarella and deny standing
to options traders in misstatement cases.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois refused to allow options traders to sue under rule lOb-5
for alleged misstatements in Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc.183
The misstatements concerned optimistic earnings projections, while
in fact the issuer suffered a decline in demand for its product.
Relying on Chiarella and Laventhall, the court dismissed the claim,
holding that options are too remote to meet the "in connection
with" element of rule lOb-5 "when the alleged deceptive acts are
merely corporate misstatements not directed in any way to the
181. See Fabozzi, supra note 163, at 555 (cost to buyer of option primarily reflects the
intrinsic value and any excess over intrinsic value); Note, supra note 175, at 805 n.135
("The relevant point for the Laventhall case is that the stock price figures in the options
price.").
182. See Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 410-11 ("It is fundamental for our understanding that
the purchase of the options did not represent contribution of capital to the corporation.").
One district court went so far as to characterize the derivative market as the "options
trading game." Data Controls North, Inc. v. Financial Corp., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1047,
1050 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1989).
183. 627 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. I1. 1985).
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options market."'8 4 The court drew no distinction between affir-
mative misrepresentation claims and insider trading actions, which
entail a failure to disclose, determining instead that Chiarella's
fiduciary duty principle applied to all rule lOb-5 actions." 5
In Starkman v. Warner Communications, Inc. ,16 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York also
rejected a suit by options traders for affirmative misstatements,
relying on Chiarella and Laventhall. Although the district court
noted that misstatements affecting the common stock's price also
affect options, it stated that "options trading is recognized as
inherently more risky than investing in shares and an investor
chooses which risk/return strategy to follow.' ' 8 7 Similarly, in Data
Controls North v. Financial Corp.,'"8 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland adopted the "more widely-held
view" by refusing to permit options traders to sue under rule lOb-
5 for alleged misstatements and omissions, stating that it was "not
prepared to extend this right to those who engage in risky specu-
lation such as that found in the options trading game."'8 9
It is unclear why courts apply Chiarella to noninsider trading
cases. Equally unclear is why courts focus on the speculative nature
of the options market to justify denying options traders recovery
in affirmative misrepresentation cases. Insider trading cases involve
184. Id. at 161. Interestingly, the court permitted the options traders to sue an alleged
tippee that purchased options, despite the lack of a fiduciary relationship between the
plaintiffs and the corporation. Id. at 163-64.
185. Id. at 161. The court stated that it would not extend liability under rule lOb-5 to
options traders because options contracts are a "riskier investment," and the corporation
does not control the number of options available in the market. Id. Unfortunately, the
opinion fails to explain why the degree of risk in options trading or the power of investors
to write option contracts outside the underlying issuer's control influences whether the
antifraud provisions apply to claims by options traders for injury caused by the corporate
defendant. Apparently, the court assumed that part of the risk undertaken by options
traders includes the risk of material misstatements by the corporation, even though rule
lOb-5 does not distinguish between different classes of securities or allow fraud to be
perpetrated on a particular class of securities.
186. 671 F. Supp. 297, 301-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The plaintiffs were options traders who
opted out of a class action settlement related to rule 10b-5 claims involving Warner
Communication's disclosure of losses from its video games division. Id. at 299.
187. Id. at 307. According to the court, "[o]ptionholders should not, and presumably
do not, expect that management owes them obligations of disclosure similar to those owed
to shareholders." Id. at 304-05. The court did not explain the basis for its conclusion that
options traders always assume the risk of material misstatements and thereby expose
themselves to fraud by choosing to invest in derivative securities.
188. 688 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1989).
189. Id. at 1050. The allegations involved a failure to fully disclose information
concerning the defendant's financial condition. Id. at 1048.
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nondisclosure of material information, and the law recognizes that
a person need not disclose information in the absence of any duty
to disclose. If a person or a corporation acts affirmatively to
disseminate information, there is a duty "not only to state the
truth but also not to suppress or conceal any facts within his
knowledge which will materially qualify those stated; if he speaks
at all, he must make a full and fair disclosure.' 190 The duty
between the parties arises because of the affirmative act of com-
municating information, not on the basis of a prior fiduciary
relationship. 191
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp. 19Z considered an options trader's
rule lOb-5 claim for false and misleading statements about losses
in one of the defendant's divisions. The district court dismissed
the claim based on Chiarella and Laventhall.193 The circuit court,
however, found that the district court's reliance on Chiarella was
"entirely misplaced," because Chiarella does not require a fidu-
ciary relationship between the parties when the defendant allegedly
made an affirmative misrepresentation. 94 The Third Circuit noted
that the price of options is closely dependent on the price of the
underlying security. Moreover, while options may not play a role
in capital formation in the securities market, the court was "not
willing to construe section 10(b) as inapplicable to option contracts
on the basis of speculation about the relationship between option
contracts, market liquidity and capital formation."19
190. First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1313 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (an
"ever-present duty not to mislead").
191. See Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1207-08
(W.D. Mo. 1983) (disclosure duty "not because of any independent personalized relationship
of trust and confidence between the defendant and the plaintiff, but rather because of the
defendant's prior affirmative act of communication."). Cf. Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 650
F. Supp. 1091, 1105 (N.D. Il. 1986), aff'd, 850 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1988) (Chiarella not
sole basis for duty of disclosure).
192. 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3176 (1989).
193. 668 F. Supp. 358 (D. Del. 1987), rev'd, 841 F.2d 502 (3d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3176 (1989).
194. 841 F.2d at 506. The court also stated that Laventhall was "simply not relevant
to the distinct issue of affirmative misrepresentations affecting a market in securities." Id.
at 507.
195. Id. at 507-08. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in In re Gulf Oil/Cities Service Tender Offer Litigation, 725 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), relied on Deutschman in rejecting the defendants' claims that options purchasers did
not have standing to bring a rule lOb-5 claim for alleged material misstatements in
connection with a tender offer. The court further held that options traders have standing
to bring claims under § 14(e) of the Williams Act, which prohibits material misstatements
or omissions in connection with tender offers, because of the close economic link between
the stock and options markets. Id. at 744.
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The First Circuit followed Deutschman's analysis in Backman
v. Polaroid Corp.'96 In Backman, the plaintiffs were purchasers
of common stock and call options for the common stock of
Polaroid Corporation. Plaintiffs alleged that the company failed
to disclose adverse information concerning sales difficulties after
previously disseminating optimistic projections. 97 The circuit court
found the reasoning of Deutschman "persuasive" in upholding
the options trader's right to sue for misrepresentations by the
defendant. 98
Although recent decisions on options traders' standing to sue
for affirmative misrepresentations have been split, Deutschman
and Backman provide the better analysis. Rule lOb-5 specifically
prohibits untrue statements of material facts or omissions of facts
necessary to make statements not misleading. Affirmative misstate-
ments directly affect all classes of an issuer's securities, including
options and debt securities. The economic reality that option
pricing is derivative of the common stock means options traders
196. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,899, diff't result on rehearing, 910 F.2d 10 (1st
Cir. 1990).
197. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,899 at 94,939. The plaintiffs alleged that Polaroid
buried a reference to "substantial expenses" relating to sales of a new camera in its Third
Quarter Report to Stockholders, and that a subsequent news release concerning the sale of
a large block of company stock by a foundation controlled by Polaroid's founder failed
to disclose the problems with the new camera. Id. at 94, 940.
198. Id. at 94,955. The court found that Laventhall's analysis does not apply to
misrepresentation claims under lOb-5. Id. at 94, 954. The district court in Backman found
that options traders had standing to bring a lOb-5 claim, but the court construed the
plaintiffs' claim to involve insider trading in connection with the sale of Polaroid stock by
the foundation without disclosing the negative information. 540 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (D.
Mass. 1982). The court's opinion did not consider Chiarella or how options traders can
bring claims for insider trading against defendants trading in a different securities market.
The district court's rationale was that options are a "security" under the definition of that
term in the Exchange Act, and lOb-5 applies to "any person." Id. at 671. The court did
note that the options trader plaintiff "may have difficulty in establishing that he was
damaged" by the defendant's trading. Id. The circuit court in Backman stated that the
plaintiffs' position below may have reflected an insider trading claim, but on appeal their
only argument was that the misrepresentations damaged the plaintiffs. Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
94,899 at 94,955.
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts also followed Deutsch-
man in Tolan v. Computervision Corp., 696 F. Supp. 771 (D. Mass. 1988), in permitting
a lOb-5 claim for affirmative misrepresentations by options traders. The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant and its officers artificially inflated the stock price through a series of
misstatements and omissions concerning operations, earnings, and projected growth. Id. at
772. The court held that there is a "fundamental distinction" between fraudulent nondis-
closure in inside trading cases and the "broader liability for issuing false and misleading
statements because the misrepresenting party can be held liable, even if he did not trade
in the security." Id. at 775. The court found that option trading "is directly affected by
the prospecti, representations and omissions of the issuer of the underlying security." Id.
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have a significant stake in the fair presentation of information by
the corporation, and any affirmative misstatement should give rise
to liability under rule lOb-5(b). Chiarella does not address the
issue of affirmative misrepresentations, and the fiduciary duty
principle articulated for insider trading claims should not be ex-
panded to limit standing for other rule lOb-5 claims.
3. Congress Attempts to Close the Chiarella Loophole
Congress tried to resolve the problem created by Chiarella that
apparently allowed persons to trade in options without being
subject to rule lOb-5. As part of the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984 (ITSA), Congress added a new Section 20(d) to the
Exchange Act, which created a private right of action against
persons trading in options while in possession of material nonpublic
information, with liability "comparable" to the liability defendants
have to shareholders.'" When Congress passed ITSA, the govern-
ment was already bringing enforcement actions under the misap-
propriation theory, thereby avoiding any Chiarella-related limitations
on claims against insiders trading in options. °°
199. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1988). Section 20(d) provides:
Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in possession
of, material nonpublic information would violate, or result in liability to any
purchaser or seller of the security under any provision of this chapter, or any
rule or regulation thereunder, such conduct in connection with a purchase or sale
of a put, call, straddle, option, or privilege with respect to such security or with
respect to a group or index of securities including such security, shall also violate
and result in comparable liability to any purchaser or seller of that security under
such provision, rule, or regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(d).
Two commentators who have analyzed the right of options traders to bring private
insider trading claims under lob-5 failed to consider § 20(d) in reaching their conclusion
that the purchasers and sellers of options should have standing to sue. Note, Insiders,
Options and the Fiduciary Principle: A Rule Job-5 Loophole, 16 FORDHAM URBAN L. J.
295 (1988) [hereinafter Note, A Rule lOb-5 Loophole]; Note, Option Investors, supra note
173, at 1962. See Wang, supra note 23, at 1056 (discussing failure to properly interpret
§ 20(d) in Note, Option Investors). One commentator's analysis led to the following
conclusion:
The insider may trade options on his company's stock based on ... material
nonpublic information in the same way he might trade the stock itself. The irony
is that while he would violate rule lOb-5 for trading stock without disclosing the
information, he would not violate the Rule by trading options.
Note, A Rule lob-5 Loophole, supra, at 322. On the contrary, the misappropriation theory
and § 20(d) impose civil and criminal liability on the insider trading in options.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 90-125 (discussing misappropriation theory).
1990]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
Section 20(d) was added by the Senate as an amendment, and
the provision received only minimal attention prior to enactment. 0 1
Although ITSA was not intended to change existing law, Section
20(d) effectively overturned part of Chiarella's fiduciary duty
principle for private options trader claims. While the government
had relied on the misappropriation theory to reach defendants
transacting in options, 20 2 private options trading plaintiffs had to
prove a relationship of trust and confidence with the insider.
Section 20(d) eliminated the requirement that options traders prove
the defendant breached a fiduciary duty. Insiders trading in options
were liable just as if they had traded in common stock, despite
the lack of a fiduciary relationship between the options trader and
the underlying corporation.
Section 20(d) elevated options traders to the same position as
common stockholders vis-a-vis insiders, at least when the defendant
purchased or sold options. The provision did not affect Chiarella's
limitation on private rule lOb-5 claims against persons who did
not have a fiduciary relationship with the corporate shareholders,
and it did not allow options traders to bring claims based on the
misappropriation theory. If stock traders would not be liable to
shareholders because there was no Chiarella relationship, there
could be no "comparable" liability to options traders. Section
20(d) did not completely eliminate the Chiarella limitation on
private rule 10b-5 actions because an options trader still had to
show the breach of a fiduciary duty owed to investors. As a result
of Section 20(d), however, the duty need not be owed directly to
the options trader.
4. The Limit of Options Traders' Standing: Claims Against
Insiders Trading in the Underlying Common Stock
In Section 20(d), Congress sought to prevent insiders from
circumventing the antifraud provisions by using derivative securi-
201. The options trader provision was not in the original version of ITSA passed by
the House, and the report on the legislation by the House Energy and Commerce Committee
does not discuss the new private cause of action. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2274 [hereinafter HOUSE ITSA REPORT].
The Senate did not submit a report accompanying the legislation, and the only discussion
of the options trader provision was in a review of the bill by Senator D'Amato, its Senate
sponsor. 130 CONG. REC. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). The House consideration of §
20(d) was confined to reprinting Senator D'Amato's remarks on the provision. Id. at H7758
(daily ed. July 25, 1984); see Wang, supra note 155, at 1189-90 (discussing brief legislative
history of § 20(d)).
202. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 833 F.2d 1086
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
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ties. The provision does not, however, determine whether options
traders can sue defendants trading on nonpublic information in
the underlying common stock. As derivative securities, options are
affected by trading in the underlying corporate stock.20 3 Whenever
an inside trader has defrauded purchasers or sellers, the options
traders have also been defrauded because they have been deprived
of the material information used by the inside trader.2°4
Laventhall dealt with a suit by an options trader against defen-
dants trading in common stock. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim because there was no "transactional nexus" between the
parties, because they traded in different markets. 205 Section 20(d)
does not, on its face, alter the conclusion in Laventhall, and
Chiarella's fiduciary duty principle continues to govern cases when
options traders sue defendants transacting in the underlying secu-
rity.
Suits by options traders against insiders trading in common
stock, and vice-versa, must be based on rule 10b-5, not section
20(d). Section 20(d) establishes liability for violations of rule lOb-
5 in transactions with purchasers and sellers of "that security,"
that is, the derivative security.2°6 The statutory private right of
203. See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 504 (3d. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 3176 (1989). ("The market price for options is directly responsive,
therefore, to changes in the market price of the underlying stock, and to information
affecting that price."). Increased demand in the equity market can lead directly to increased
demand in the derivative market and vice-versa. For example, the insider's purchase of
common stock may increase demand for the stock by causing brokers to purchase additional
shares to replenish their inventory or to cover a short position. Some market makers selling
the shares may cover their position by purchasing call options for the underlying common
stock. If there is a sufficient increase in demand for the stock, other firms may enter the
market to follow the increase in the volume. The price of the stock and options may then
increase because of greater demand. Similarly, if an insider purchases call options, firms
writing the call options may cover their position by acquiring options from other firms or
by purchasing the underlying common stock if the options are exercised. The interrelation-
ship- of the equity and derivative securities markets means that transactions on one market
will affect trading on the security's related market.
204. See Crespi, Private Rights of Action for Option Position Holders Under Section
20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 16 SEc. REG. L.J. 21, 28 (1988) (reasonable to
construe § 20(d) to confer on option holders a cause of action against insider.trading in
stock where option traders suffer injury).
205. Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 846 (1983).
206. Professor Wang notes that the language of § 20(d) is ambiguous, and "that
security" may refer to the derivative securities listed in the provision, or to the underlying
common stock. Wang, supra note 155, at 1188. The better interpretation, based on the
legislative history of the section, is that Congress intended to give options traders a cause
of action against insiders trading options comparable to the insider's liability for trading
stock to persons trading in the equity market. Id. at 1190. Section 20(d) does not appear
to provide a statutory basis for option traders to sue insiders trading in common stock.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
action for options traders has created an exception to rule lOb-5's
standing limitations, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chi-
arella, but has not overturned the fiduciary duty limitation on
lOb-5 actions. Section 20(d) cannot be read as implicitly amending
rule lOb-5 to permit claims by any person injured by insider
trading, because ITSA was not meant to change the law of insider
trading, including Chiarella.207 Congressional encouragement of
private claims under rule lOb-5 is not tantamount to eliminating
Chiarella's fiduciary duty requirement for insider trading actions.
If a residual effect of rule lOb-5 is to allow options traders to
sue persons trading common stock, Section 20(d) is superfluous,
because options traders would have standing to bring insider
trading actions without the need for any additional statutory basis.
Commentators argue that both the economic similarity between
options and stock and the fact that options help keep the market
in the underlying stock liquid justify granting options traders
standing under rule lOb-5 to sue insiders trading in the common
stock.2 °8 Economic identity does not, however, affect whether the
inside trader owes a fiduciary duty to the options-trading plaintiff.
Congress fully recognized that Section 20(d) eliminated a loophole
in rule lOb-5 caused by Chiarella, but nonetheless did not overturn
that decision. 209
C. Debt Securities: Overlooked but Not Unprotected
Corporations raise capital not only by issuing stock, but also by
borrowing. Companies now avoid bank loans by directly tapping
the national and international securities markets to raise funds
through public and private debt offerings. 210 Large amounts of
207. See HOUSE ITSA REPORT, supra note 201, at 13-14 (House committee rejected
proposal to enact a definition of "insider trading" because law in that area was sufficiently
well developed).
208. See Note, Option Investors, supra note 173, at 1969 (options decrease stock
volatility, increase market liquidity, and promote trading; fairness "dictates that the
corporation and its insiders owe option investors some duty in return for these benefits.");
Note, Option Trader Standing, supra note 173, at 639-40 (disclosure of information
influences both stock and options prices, and "lack of potential privity between insiders
trading in stock and option traders is irrelevant in an open market trading situation.").
209. See CONG. REC. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato)
(Section 20(d) makes clear that "it is not possible to insulate oneself from the prohibition
of insider trading by restricting activity to securities that are derivative of the securities to
which the material nonpublic information relates.").
210. See EcoNoMic DIVISION OF THE CONGREssIoNAL RESEARCH SERVICE 100TH CONG.,
IST SEss., LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND TE POT OF GOLD: TRENDS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CASE
STUDIES 6 (Comm. Print 1987) (leveraged buyout market expanded as investment banks
provided corporations direct access to public debt markets) [hereinafter LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
REPORT].
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this debt have been used to shrink or eliminate the corporate equity
base through repurchases of stock.
The growth of corporate debt has expanded the securities mar-
kets for commercial paper, which represent short-term borrowings,
and bonds, which represent long-term obligations. Much of the
debt market's expansion in the 1980s was fueled by the explosive
development and creative uses of "junk" bonds to finance cor-
porate transactions ranging from recapitalizations to leveraged buy-
outs. Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud in transactions involving "secu-
rities," but until recently the possibility of insider trading in
corporate bonds was minimal. The development of the bond
market and the use of debt as an important tool of corporate
finance creates the strong possibility that some may seek to profit
from transactions in corporate debt instruments by the use of
material nonpublic information.
Traditional corporate law principles recognized a corporation's
fiduciary duty to its equity owners. Creditors, including bond
owners, were governed by the contractual terms of their agreement,
the trust indenture, and directors' duties to creditors were limited. 2 1
The recent development of new, innovative securities has created
investment vehicles that feature characteristics of both stocks and
bonds. As one author has noted:
Distinctions between debt and equity securities are increasingly blurred
in today's capital markets. High-yield, low-rated bonds look like debt
but trade like equities. Many preferred stocks look more like debt than
equity. Hybrid securities, such as convertibles, combine debt and equity
features. 22
The trend in corporate transactions to make extensive use of debt
securities to finance deals has increased volatility in the bond
market. Especially in leveraged buy-outs, in which the corporation
assumes an enormous debt load in comparison to the owners'
equity investment, blue chip corporate bonds have been subject to
large price swings." 3
211. See FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 849 (perm. ed. 1986) (directors not wholly without
duty to creditors, but there is a conflict as to the scope of the duty).
212. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 417 (1986)
(citations omitted).
213. See Herman, Corporate Bonds Remain Tainted from Buy-Outs, Wall St. J., Oct.
12, 1989, at Cl, col. 1 (decline in value and effect on corporate bond prices from massive
$25 billion RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout continues one year after transaction); Winkler
& White, Shock Still Clouds Blue-Chip Corporate Bond Market, Wall St. J., Mar. 22,
1989, at C1' col. I (bond market remains shaken by RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout as
investors continue to shun corporate debt market and demand greater protection from
extraordinary transactions in debt covenants).
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The potential for trading on inside information in corporate
bonds has increased because the market value of corporate bonds
is sensitive to transactions involving additional debt. 214 The value
of junk bonds can plumet when the company experiences cash
flow problems endangering its ability to meet current interest
obligations. The insider trading scenario would be different for
debt securities than for transactions in stock or options, however,
because the insider anticipates a decline in the price of bonds
already outstanding. The trader would seek to avoid a loss from
the expected decline in the bond price by selling any holdings, or
to profit by selling short the debt securities, rather than acquiring
the issuer's stock or options.
Whether bondholders have standing to sue for violations of rule
lOb-5 depends on how broadly courts construe the duty owed to
the corporation's creditors. 215 In Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,21 6 the Third Circuit held that corporate
management owed owners of convertible bonds a fiduciary duty
because "we are here dealing with securities having an equity
option feature. ' 21 7 In Broad v. Rockwell International Corp. ,28
the Fifth Circuit held that a controlling stockholder owed a fidu-
ciary duty to creditors, including convertible bondholders, but the
duty was not breached if the stockholder complied with the terms
of the trust indenture.21 9 In Harff v. Kerkorian,20 however, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that directors did not owe a fiduciary
duty to bondholders, including convertible bondholders. 22' If bond-
holders are not owed a fiduciary duty by the corporation and its
insiders, transactions in debt securities while in possession of
material nonpublic information would not be a violation of rule
lOb-5 under Chiarella.
214. See LEVERAGED BUYOUT REPORT, supra note 210, at 58 (as new debt is added to
a company as a result of a transaction, the value of the old debt declines).
215. McDaniel argue that courts should recognize a fiduciary duty to bondholders owed
by the corporation and its directors, especially in extraordinary corporate transactions when
stockholders reap the benefits of the transaction while the corporation increases its debt.
McDaniel, supra note 212, at 449-50. If bondholders are not owed a fiduciary duty there
will be a "large gap" in rule lOb-5. Id. at 294. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders,
13 J. CORP. L. 205, 266 (1988).
216. 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
217. Id. at 941.
218. 614 F.2d 418, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 642 F.2d 929, 958, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981).
219. Id. at 438-39.
220. 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
221. Id. at 134.
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The United States Supreme Court held in Pepper v. Litton,222
that "fiduciary standards of conduct" govern a majority stock-
holder's dealings with "the corporation, its stockholders, and its
creditors.'"223 Whether courts might have relied on Pepper v. Litton
to bypass any limitations imposed by Chiarella on bondholders in
lOb-5 cases was rendered moot by the enactment of ITSFEA's
contemporaneous trader provision. The new Section 20A permits
claims for trading while in possession of material nonpublic in-
formation by persons purchasing or selling "securities of the same
class, ' 224 and the Exchange Act's definition of 'security' means
any note, . . . bond, debenture .... "225
Unlike options traders, who do not have a fiduciary relationship
with the corporation, purchasers and sellers of convertible deben-
tures may argue that an insider trading in the common stock that
is the class of security related to their conversion option has
breached a fiduciary duty to the convertible bondholders by trading,
on nonpublic information. 226 The conversion value of convertible
debentures is based, in part, on the price of the underlying equity
security. As the Third Circuit noted in Pittsburgh Terminal Corp.
v. Baltimore and Maryland Railroad Co. ,227 convertible debentures
have an equity feature that imparts the fiduciary duty owed to
other equity owners of the corporation. In order to bring a rule
lOb-5 claim against an insider trading in common stock, however,
convertible debenture holders would have to overcome Laventhall's
"transactional nexus" analysis, which requires that plaintiffs trans-
act in the same market as the defendant.
Convertible securities present a troublesome question under rule
lOb-5 because the security's value is affected, at least partially, by
transactions in the equity security into which it can be converted,
yet private parties cannot bring claims against insiders trading in
the stock under Laventhall. Convertible debentures bear some
similarity to options, in that the value of both-is derivative of a
222. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
223. Id. at 311.
224. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1988).
225. Id. § 78c(10).
226. Convertible corporate securities are usually either preferred stocks or bonds that
are exchangeable at the holder's option for a set number of another form of securities,
usually common stock. See J. DOWNES & J. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 78 (2d ed. 1987). A convertible debenture's value consists of the return
on the debt investment and the potential value of the equity conversion. See J. WALMSLEY,
THE NEw FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: AN INVESTOR'S GUmE 65 (1988). Convertibles will
usually have a fixed conversion price for exchanging to the common stock of the issuer.
227. 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
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related security, but the convertible debenture does not receive the
same protection that options received under Section 20(d), and
Section 20A cannot be stretched to cover trading outside the class
of securities in which the insider traded. Congress, therefore, left
a gap in the right it granted to private parties to bring claims
against insider traders by ignoring convertible securities. That gap
should be filled by granting holders of these securities a right of
action.
D. Corporate Claims Under Rule 1ob-5 for Insider Trading:
The Legacy of Chiarella
The one party overlooked regularly in rule 1Ob-5 actions involv-
ing insider trading is the corporation whose information was used
to reap a benefit in the securities market. Until recently, defrauded
corporations did not raise their voices in federal court to protest
the exploitation of their property. Anheuser-Busch Companies,
Inc. finally broke the silence in 1986 by suing inside traders and
tippees who used information about an impending acquisition when
purchasing shares of the target corporation. The corporate plaintiff
in Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. v. Thayer228 alleged that, as a result
of the insider trading, the target's stock price was increased arti-
ficially, increasing the cost of the transaction by eighty million
dollars. Anheuser-Busch premised its rule lOb-5 claim on the
misappropriation theory, and the court permitted it to proceed to
trial. 229
In FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 230 FMC Corporation sued perhaps the
most famous inside trader, Ivan Boesky, over corporate informa-
tion leaked to Boesky concerning a proposed recapitalization that
included a $70 per share cash payment to shareholders. In the
four days prior to the initial announcement of the recapitalization,
Boesky acquired 95,300 shares, approximately thirteen percent of
the total volume during that period, and the stock price rose from
$71.25 to approximately $85.231 Two months later, while FMC
considered increasing the cash payment, Boesky and others with
knowledge of FMC's deliberations acquired 1,922,000 more shares. 232
228. Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Thayer, No. CA3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex. filed Apr. 26,
1986).
229. See, Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Thayer, No. CA3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19,
1986) (Order Denying Summary Judgment), discussed in Goelzer and Bereuffy, Insider
Trading: The Search for a Definition, 39 ALA. L. REv. 491, 515 n.143 (1988).
230. 673 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. 111. 1987) reV'd, 852 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1988).
231. Id. at 244.
232. Id.
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FMC ultimately raised the cash payment to $80 per share, increas-
ing the cost of the recapitalization by $220,000,000 and Boesky
and other insiders realized a profit in excess of $20,000,000.233
The district court dismissed the rule lOb-5 claim, holding that
FMC did not have standing under Article III of the Constitution
because it had not been injured by the defendants. 23 4 The court
viewed the recapitalization as a distribution of assets from the
corporation to its shareholders and held that there was not a
purchase or sale of securities in the transaction. 2"5 Because the
shareholders held the same assets as before the transaction, the
court found that FMC was not injured by Boesky's fraudulent
trading and dismissed the complaint.23 6
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff corpo-
ration had standing under Article III to bring its claim in federal
court.2 7 The circuit court emphasized that it was not determining
whether FMC had standing under the securities laws, 238 but only
that Boesky's "misappropriation constitutes a distinct and palpable
injury that is legally cognizable under Article III's case or contro-
versy requirement. ' 23 9 The opinion posited that, although FMC
was not deprived of the use of the information, it "was denied
the right to use exclusively its confidential information. And that
is an injury.' ' 240
The district and circuit courts' analyses bear little relation to
the proper analysis of an insider trading action under rule 10b-5.
The district court found that FMC's claim did not meet the Article
III case or controversy requirement for constitutional standing, a
wholly unnecessary conclusion that only obfuscates the lOb-5 anal-
ysis. Because FMC did not sell its own securities in the recapital-
ization, it failed to satisfy the Blue Chip purchase-or-sale
233. Id.
234. Id. at 251.
235. Id. at 250. The court found that "[A]fter the recapitalization, the shareholders of
FMC, while remaining the same, held different equity interests than before. Thus, the
transaction effected a shift of part of the equity from public shareholders to management
shareholders." Id.
236. Id. at 251.
237. 852 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1988).
238. Id. at 989 ("[Tihat FMC was not injured in a way covered by certain securities
laws does not mean it was not injured at all.") (emphasis in originali.
239. Id. at 989-90.
240. Id. at 991. Although the majority stated that it was not reaching the issue of
whether FMC stated a cognizable claim under the federal securities laws, id. at 994, Judge
Mannion dissented, stating that "FMC may be irritated, but it has not been injured." Id.
at 997 (Mannion, J., dissenting).
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requirement. 241 Instead of dismissing the case on that ground,
however, the district court unnecessarily used the constitutional
standing barrier to find that FMC was not injured in the trans-
action.
Unfortunately, the circuit court compounded the problem by
failing to reject the district court's constitutional injury analysis,
instead citing Carpenter v. United States42 for the proposition that
the misappropriation of valuable, confidential business information
constitutes an injury. 243 Without analyzing whether FMC could
even bring its claim under the securities laws, the Seventh Circuit
adopted Carpenter's misappropriation theory of liability to find
an injury for constitutional purposes. Regardless of whether the
circuit court's constitutional analysis was correct, FMC could not
bring a rule 10b-5 action because, as noted above, it did not meet
the Blue Chip standing requirement. The opinions in FMC Corp.
unnecessarily reached a constitutional issue while ignoring the
proper standing analysis for rule 10b-5.
Any corporation whose information is used for insider trading
faces substantial hurdles in pursuing a private rule 10b-5 action.
First, if the transaction did not involve the purchase or sale of
the corporation's securities prior to the public announcement, Blue
Chip prohibits the corporation from suing. This may occur in
recapitalizations similar to the one in FMC Corp., involving an
extraordinary dividend or security swaps that do not involve a
purchase or sale. Another transaction that does not meet the Blue
Chip standard is when the offeror ultimately does not acquire any
shares of the target corporation because the transaction cannot be
completed. This may occur if the offeror cannot secure financing
or if a competing offeror succeeds. By never purchasing the target's
stock, the unsuccessful tender offeror does not satisfy the Blue
Chip standard even though information about its plans may have
been the basis of the inside trader's purchases.
Second, even if the corporate plaintiff overcomes the Blue Chip
requirement, it will usually be on the same side of the transaction
as the inside trading defendants, because the defendants will pursue
the same course of action as the corporation to capitalize on the
market's lack of knowledge prior to an announcement. This situ-
ation is exemplified by a hostile tender offer, when the target
corporation does not have information about the offer prior to
the announcement and the information has been misappropriated
241. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
242. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
243. FMC Corp., 852 F.2d. at 990.
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from the offeror. The corporation whose information is misappro-
priated will not be a "contemporaneous" trader under either
Section 20A or the case law because it could not have traded with
the defendant, but only with defrauded purchasers or sellers.
Moreover, in transactions in which a corporation acquires shares
of a publicly traded company, the target company will not have
a fiduciary relationship with the inside trader who uses the offeror's
information. 244 The acquiring corporation will usually have the
necessary fiduciary relationship with the trader, or the information
will have been misappropriated from that corporation, but the
insider will not have traded in the acquiror's securities, only the
target's. Therefore, Chiarella's requirement that the defendant owe
a duty of disclosure to the corporation in whose securities the
insider traded, and to its shareholders, persists as a substantial
limitation on standing for corporations bringing private rule lOb-
5 actions.
Third, the corporation may not be able to prove any injury
from the insider trading. As the district court analysis in FMC
Corp. demonstrates, in transactions that provide shareholders with
a portion of the corporate assets as an extraordinary distribution,
the only "injury" is the conversion of more assets to cash for use
by the corporation's owners; the corporation has not "lost" an-
ything. Even in tender offers, whether made by a hostile bidder
or friendly suitor, the defendant's transactions may be small com-
pared to the total volume of shares traded during the period.
Increases in the target's stock price may be attributable to rumors
concerning the target, foothold purchases by potential bidders prior
to an announcement, or even a general rise in the market, rather
than to trading by persons in possession of nonpublic informa-
tion.245
A corollary issue is whether an inside trader should be liable
for all damages a corporation may sustain from increases in the
stock price, especially when the insider's. profits are minuscule
compared to the plaintiff's alleged loss.246 Even assuming the
increased costs of the transaction could be traced to the defendant's
244. See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) (advisor
to potential offeror does not have fiduciary duty to shareholders of target corporation).
245. See A STUDY BY THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, STOCK TRADING BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TENDER OFFERS: INSIDER
TRADING OR MARKET ANTICIPATION? (1987) (reviewing data from 172 tender offers between
1981 and 1985 to determine why prices rise prior to announcement of transaction).
246. Even in FMC, when the trading defendants made over $20 million, the corporate
plaintiff claimed a loss attributable to trading prior to the announcement of $220 million.
FMC Corp., 673 F. Supp. at 244.
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trading, imposing liability for all costs related to an increase in
the market price would be "Draconian. '247
The original version of ITSFEA provided a private right of
action to any person, other than contemporaneous traders, injured
by trading in material nonpublic information to recover any dam-
ages caused by the violation. 248 The House Energy and Commerce
Committee deleted the provision prior to sending the bill to the
floor to "avoid creating an express cause of action which might
have the unintended effect of freezing the law or in any way
restricting the potential rights of actions which have been implied
by the court in this area. ' 249 Although the House Committee
eliminated this provision, the House ITSFEA Report reviewed the
Anheuser-Busch Cos. case and stated that the Committee "ex-
pressly recognizes the implied right of action under the securities
laws for cases including but not limited to the situations such as
that noted above in the Anheuser-Busch case. '2 0
Congressional recognition of the viability of the Anheuser-Busch
Cos. suit, however, does not eliminate the limitations imposed on
rule 10b-5 claims in Blue Chip and Chiarella. Congress did not
overrule the Supreme Court precedents interpreting rule lOb-5, and
it is extremely unlikely that a passage in a House Committee
247. The flip side of the damages issue is whether corporate bidders should be protected
from insider trading by the federal securities laws, which are primarily designed to protect
investors in the public markets through the disclosure and antifraud provisions. See
Seligman, supra note 17, at 1103-15 (describing policies of securities acts). An amendment
to the securities laws has been proposed to create a private cause of action on behalf of
corporations whose nonpublic information has been used in trading, similar to the § 16(b)
short-swing profits claim that can be made on behalf of the issuer. See Karjala, Statutory
Regulation of Insider Trading in Impersonal Markets, 1982 DUKE L.J. 627, 641 (1982).
248. The original bill provided:
Any person (other than a person entitled to recovery solely under paragraph (1)
of this subsection [contemporaneous traders]) injured by a violation described in
such paragraph in connection with such person's purchase or sale of securities
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to seek recovery of
any damages caused by reason of such violation, or for appropriate equitable
relief, or both.
Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of
the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1989). The SEC's
proposed legislation contained a substantively identical provision. See SEC Legislative
Proposal, supra note 7, at 1818.
249. HousE ITSFEA REPORT, supra note 150, at 27. The Report's statement concerning
the reason for dropping the noncontemporaneous trader provision, which would have
allowed corporations whose information was used for insider trading to recover damages,
appears to be disingenuous because the section was so controversial that its inclusion in
the bill threatened passage of ITSFEA. See Kaswell, An Insider's View, supra note 28, at
168 (discussing reasons for deleting provision in committee).
250. HousE ITSFEA REPORT, supra note 150, at 28.
INSIDER TRADING
Report can validate a cause of action that Congress refused to
enact and that does not otherwise meet the standing requirements
created by the courts.
Corporate plaintiffs that cannot bring claims under Section 20A
or Section 20(d), which substantially relax the fiduciary duty
principle, must meet the traditional rule lOb-5 requirements and
prove that they were purchasers or sellers of the securities, that
their transactions were contemporaneous with the defendant's, and
that the fraud involved the breach of a duty of trust and confidence
owed by the defendant to the corporate issuer and its shareholders.
The irony of rule lOb-5 insider trading litigation is that those
parties who can show a breach of the fiduciary duty by an employee
or other "temporary" insider, and who have been directly de-
frauded by the defendant, usually are corporations and their
investment advisers. These parties generally will not have traded
in the securities during the same period as the defendant and,
therefore, do not have standing to sue.
If Congress supports an expansive approach to corporate rule
10b-5 claims and is serious about encouraging suits similar to
Anheuser-Busch Cos., it should specifically grant standing to these
plaintiffs, instead of relying on the judiciary to hurdle the road-
blocks erected by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip and Chiarella.
If the fear of Draconian liability requires limiting a private cause
of action, Congress should craft rules that will make a corporate
plaintiff's damage award proportionate to the defendant's gain
realized or loss avoided.
IV. CONCLUSION
The haphazard development of the standing requirements for
private rule lOb-5 actions has left a confusing trail for plaintiffs
and courts to follow. Congress has restricted Chiarella's applica-
bility to private claims by contemporaneous traders who transact
in the same class as the inside trader, in addition to granting
options traders an express right of action. The fiduciary duty
principle, however, remains viable for claims by options and
convertible securities traders suing for transactions in the under-
lying common stock, despite the effect trading in the underlying
security has on the value of derivative securities. That the confusion
has spread to some courts is evident from the application of
Chiarella to affirmative misrepresentation claims under rule 10b-5
by options traders. This is entirely inconsistent with the proper
understanding of the duty to correct any misstatements or omis-
sions owed by corporations and persons that publicly disseminate
false information. Despite its enthusiasm for rule lOb-5 claims by
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private parties, Congress thus far has been unwilling to take the
final step in crafting a coherent scheme to determine which parties
have standing. Until Congress acts, private parties will continue
to argue preliminary issues of standing rather than the substantive
question of whether they were injured by the fraudulent use of
nonpublic information in the trading of securities.
